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ABSTRACT 
 
On July 31, 2004, the United States Coast Guard stopped the container ship 
CSAV RIO PUELO off of the Port of New York and New Jersey. The intervention 
occurred after the United States Department of Agriculture received information that an 
on board container of Argentine lemons carried a "harmful biological substance."  The 
ship was held at anchor for six days as officials tested containers and weighed options of 
how to best prevent the release of a hazardous substance.  Although the information 
which triggered the government response later proved to be a hoax, the economic damage 
to particular businesses was quite real.  
  
This thesis explores the broad range of costs - direct, indirect and intangible - 
incurred by businesses up and down supply chains within the shipping industry.  Because 
the United States government may seek to recover its incident response costs, these 
intervention expenses have been included as well.  The costs reported here were obtained 
by interviewing representatives of the businesses and government agencies involved in 
the incident. The case provides decision makers in both business and government a 
detailed example of the economic costs (real and potential) of Homeland Security 
interventions leading, presumably, to more informed policy and practice. 
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CHAPTER  
1 
Introduction 
The Coast Guard escorted the container ship CSAV Rio Puelo to the 
Maher Terminal at the Port of Newark, N.J., today after holding the 
ship at Ambrose Anchorage since Saturday due to an unconfirmed 
anonymous report involving containers of contaminated lemons on 
board. In coordination with federal state and local authorities the 
containers’ contents will be examined, fumigated, and destroyed using 
a carefully developed process that puts public safety and port security 
first. The Coast Guard was alerted by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture on July 29 that they received a report that one of five 
containers carrying lemons aboard the CSAV Rio Puelo contained an 
unknown "harmful biological substance."1 
On July 30, 2004, less than one month before New York City hosted the 
Republican Party National Convention, the U.S. Coast Guard intervened in the voyage of 
the container ship CSAV RIO PUELO (see Appendix 1).  Flagged in the Marshall Islands 
and operated by the German company Oskar Wehr, the RIO PUELO was chartered by 
the Chilean commercial shipping firm Compania Sudamericana de Vapores, also known 
as CSAV.  Among its other cargo, the RIO PUELO was carrying five shipping containers 
of Argentine lemons being shipped to a produce distributor in Montreal, Canada.  Based 
upon information provided by an anonymous source to the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the lemons were suspected of containing a hazardous biological agent.   
Although all tests conducted upon the containers of lemons showed no evidence of any 
known biological agent, the RIO PUELO was kept at sea off of the Port of New 
York/New Jersey for one week.  Eventually the lemons were destroyed and the RIO 
PUELO was able to continue with its voyage.  
                                                
1 U.S. Coast Guard First District Press Release, August 6, 2004. 
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The Washington Post estimated the value of the destroyed lemons at $70,000 
($US) (Blustein and Byrnes, 2004).  The direct loss of the lemons is just the “tip of the 
iceberg” in the business disruption that this U.S. government intervention caused to at 
least three other nations.  At the time the RIO PUELO was interdicted by the U.S. Coast 
Guard, the ship was carrying a total of 1,084 shipping containers.  The fate of all of these 
containers, coming from and bound for ports in numerous countries, was unavoidably 
tied to the five containers carrying the Argentine lemons. 
All indications are that homeland security concerns in a post-9/11 world will 
continue to require the U.S. government to stop commercial shipping from time to time.  
Prior to the halting of the RIO PUELO, in September 2002 the container ship 
PALERMO-SENATOR was prevented from mooring in New Jersey and was held six 
miles offshore for more than two days when low levels of radiation were detected by a 
U.S. Coast Guard boarding team; ceramic tiles among the cargo turned out to be a 
harmless and naturally occurring source of the radiation (Smothers, 2002).  More recently, 
the cruise ship ZANDAAM was delayed for six hours off of Port Canaveral prior to 
Superbowl XXXIX in February 2005 when it was discovered that a passenger had 
brought a gun aboard the ship (Local6.com, 2004). 
Through this research I will estimate the business expenses (direct and indirect as 
well as monetary and non-monetary) incurred by the numerous affected parties in the 
case of the RIO PUELO incident.  Through compiling and detailing these real costs I 
hope to provide a reference that will benefit both government policymakers and business 
executives in their decision making.  For government policymakers, this detailing of costs 
can help to inform risk-based decision making by providing a representative case for the 
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impact of interferences in commercial shipping; acute risks to homeland security must be 
balanced with the potential for chronic erosion to U.S. business competitiveness.  For 
business executives, the case of the RIO PUELO provides an example of the costs, both 
short and long term, that must be borne by a business if a government intervenes in a 
shipment of goods due to security concerns.  Armed with information on the magnitude 
of these potential expenses, executives can conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine if 
cost mitigation programs (compliance with international security practices, purchases of 
additional insurance, etc.) should be undertaken. 
My personal interest in this research lies in the fact that the U.S. Coast Guard 
serves (among its many missions) as both a protector of U.S. territorial waters and ports 
and a facilitator of safe and efficient commercial shipping.  Although I have served 
nearly ten years of seagoing duty during my seventeen years as a U.S. Coast Guard 
officer, my knowledge of the intricacies and networks within international commercial 
shipping has been quite limited.  The information I have sought out for this thesis has 
broadened my perspective on the challenges facing commercial shippers today, and 
should assist me and the U.S. Coast Guard as policies are developed to balance the needs 
of homeland security and commercial efficiency. 
Methodology 
I began the research by reviewing all newspaper accounts and U.S. Coast Guard 
press releases that appeared while the RIO PUELO event was ongoing.  I then searched 
for and reviewed after-the-fact articles and analyses from newspapers, journals and 
Internet sources.   With these two data sources, I gathered and corroborated information 
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on the basic timeline for the RIO PUELO incident, and compiled a preliminary list of the 
businesses involved.  I also used my personal contacts from my U.S. Coast Guard career 
to corroborate facts and to gain initial points of contact into such businesses as the Port 
Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ) and Compañía Sudamericana de 
Vapores (CSAV).   
I then undertook the task of contacting each of the businesses involved, as well as 
the PANYNJ and the U.S. Coast Guard offices that handled the response to the RIO 
PUELO case.  In most cases, one to three weeks was required to allow for each 
organization to clear their participation in the research through their legal offices and 
executive leadership.  Each business was then requested to detail the expenses it incurred, 
either directly or indirectly, as a result of the RIO PUELO incident.  Over the course of 
three months, nearly 50 letters, 30 telephone interviews and 200 emails were used to 
obtain information (see Appendix 2 for typical questions) and to pose follow-on 
questions. 
Through the process of contacting and obtaining data from the preliminary 
contacted businesses, I was able to learn of additional businesses that were impacted by 
the RIO PUELO incident.  These companies included consignees who also had 
containers aboard the RIO PUELO during the delayed voyage, and firms further up and 
down the supply chain that were engaged in shipping the Argentine lemons to Canada. 
I contacted this latter group by sending three letters to Montreal and Buenos Aires 
(see Appendix 3 for example letter).  These letters resulted in telephone interviews from 
the firms that incurred costs. 
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To simplify the task of contacting a representative sample of the businesses 
shipping or receiving the 1,084 containers aboard the RIO PUELO, I narrowed my 
review to the containers most directly affected by the six-day delay off of New York, the 
456 containers scheduled to be discharged in Port Elizabeth, New Jersey.  The cargo 
manifests for these containers was provided by CSAV.  I  reviewed the freight listed  
within these manifests to select 84 containers (see Appendix 4) that appeared to contain 
goods that were either perishable (e.g., fruits, seafood, etc.) or components needed for 
manufacturing firms (e.g., automotive components, electrical motors, etc.).  Rather than 
taking a random sample, I targeted these specific types of freight to increase the 
likelihood that the companies polled would have experienced an actual cost from the 
delay of the RIO PUELO.   
These 84 containers originated from and were bound to 46 businesses, shippers, 
consignees2 or shipping agents.  Not unusual, some of the consignees served as their own 
shipping agents.  To each of these businesses I sent a letter requesting information on any 
costs incurred by the six-day delay in the arrival of their freight.  Since the selection of 
businesses spanned the nations of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Canada and 
the United States of America, I had the letter translated into Spanish and Portuguese from 
the original English (see Appendix 5).  When businesses did not respond to my letter, I 
attempted to call the firm if a telephone number was available.  In the end, a lack of 
response left me with the assumption that the firm incurred no costs significant enough to 
report. 
                                                
2 recipients 
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Throughout this research I was able on many, but not all, occasions to corroborate 
the expenses claimed by the businesses.  This corroboration came from other businesses 
and government agencies such as the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey and the 
U.S. Coast Guard.  In most cases I was unable to match exact figures; with the exception 
of the disputed costs detailed in the chapters to follow, however, the costs recollected by 
corroborating parties were roughly the same, generally within $1,000. 
Because of the difficulties in determining clear cost causality and the lack of 
multiple sources to corroborate many of the valuations, however, this research represents 
the best estimate available to the author.  All of the information I was provided was 
contained in the public domain or voluntarily provided by businesses and governmental 
agencies; proprietary and other internal information may not be accurately reflected in 
this research.  Likewise, although I have attempted to examine all direct and indirect 
costs resulting from the RIO PUELO incident, the complex and extensive network of 
businesses and governmental agencies involved in international commerce effectively 
guarantees that this research, while extensive, is not exhaustive.   
It is not the purpose of this research to assess the actions or determine the liability 
on the part of any of the business or government parties involved in the incident in 
question.  The limitations of this research mentioned in the previous paragraph should 
preclude the use of this research in any litigation or determination of liability.  
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CHAPTER  
2 
Synopsis of Events 
In order to provide a context for the various costs that arise from the RIO PUELO 
incident, it is necessary to briefly recount the voyage of the container ship from mid-July 
2004 until mid-August 2004.   
At the time of the incident, the RIO PUELO was engaged in its typical seven-
week voyage, visiting ports along the Atlantic and Caribbean coasts of North and South 
America.  CSAV normally has enough ships on this circuit to result in the arrival of a 
CSAV vessel in each port roughly each week.  The ports may vary slightly from voyage 
to voyage, but the North American ports are usually Port Elizabeth, New Jersey; Norfolk, 
Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; Charleston, South Carolina; and Miami, Florida.  During 
this voyage, the RIO PUELO was bound from Puerto Cabello, Venezuela to Port 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, with subsequent stops scheduled in Norfolk, Charleston and 
Miami before returning to South American ports.  During an earlier portcall in Rio 
Grande, Brazil on July 13th, five CSAV containers filled with 117.8 long tons (119,700 
kilograms) of fresh Argentine lemons from the firm Real Frut S.A. had been loaded 
aboard the RIO PUELO. 
The lemons had been ordered by CDA Green Garden in Montreal, Canada 
through the Argentine firm Pampa Store.  Pampa Store paid Real Frut to package and 
arrange shipping of the lemons.  The five containers of lemons were scheduled to be 
discharged from the RIO PUELO in Port Elizabeth for further overland shipping to 
 14 
Montreal, Canada.  Although the lemons had originally been ordered by CDA Green 
Garden, the entire order was sold to another Canadian firm, APEX Corporation.  Such 
enroute transfers of cargos are not uncommon, according to a CSAV official, especially 
with perishable commodities such as produce. 
Approximately one day prior to its scheduled arrival in Port Elizabeth on July 
31st the RIO PUELO received a Captain of the Port (COTP) Order from U.S. Coast 
Guard Activities New York to anchor offshore in the vicinity of the Ambrose light tower, 
just over seven nautical miles east of Sandy Hook, New Jersey.  The RIO PUELO safely 
anchored offshore on July 31st, where it was met by a U.S. Coast Guard boarding team.  
The boarding team quickly located the five containers of lemons, checked the health of 
the crew and informed the master that there were concerns that the lemons in the five 
containers had been tainted with a biological agent.  Over the course of the next six days, 
the five containers holding the suspect lemons were externally tested, looking for any 
potentially hazardous agents.  Testing likely did not include opening the containers both 
because of the structural integrity provided by the doors of shipping containers (each of 
the lemon containers had two or three other containers stacked upon it), and out of 
concern of possibly releasing a harmful agent.  The lemons were being shipped in 
refrigerated containers.  While the RIO PUELO was at anchorage, the temperature of the 
containers was lowered from 4.5 degrees Celsius (40 degrees Fahrenheit) to below 
freezing (less than 0 degrees Celsius (or 32 degrees Fahrenheit)).  Along with closing the 
container vents and drains, this freezing of the lemons was likely undertaken to destroy or 
reduce the activity of any hazardous agents; the action effectively ruined the fresh citrus 
fruit. 
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On August 6th, the RIO PUELO was permitted to proceed to Berth 50 of Maher 
Terminal in Port Elizabeth, New Jersey to discharge and onload its scheduled cargo.  The 
five containers of suspect lemons were transferred to a barge.  The RIO PUELO sailed 
the following day, August 7th, for its next scheduled portcall in Norfolk, Virginia. 
The barge with the five containers of suspect lemons on deck was moored at 
Public Berth 34 of Port Newark.  This relatively remote berth was likely selected to 
minimize the chance of fumigation operations interfering with commercial shipping 
operations in the port.  Generator sets were placed on the wharf adjacent to the barge to 
provide power for the refrigerated containers and for the fumigation equipment.   
Over the course of the next week, the containers underwent a series of tests and 
fumigation.  Access holes were cut into the CSAV containers and ducting fitted to 
provide for the fumigation of the container contents.  After each of the containers was 
fumigated, the lemons were removed and tested one last time before being hauled off for 
incineration.  The containers were then tested and cleaned before being returned to CSAV, 
which had to repair the holes in the containers before they could be returned to service. 
The delay of the RIO PUELO had placed the ship only one day ahead of the next 
CSAV liner due in United States east coast ports.  In order to restore RIO PUELO to its 
original schedule, CSAV made the decision to have the ship skip its portcall in Miami 
and proceed directly to its next scheduled South American port.  In order to facilitate this 
rerouting, CSAV planned to have the RIO PUELO discharge its Miami cargo in 
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Charleston, and requested a waiver from the Jones Act3 to allow the next CSAV liner to 
pick up the discharged containers in Charleston and then deliver them to Miami.  The 
waiver request cited the principle of Force Majeure as grounds for its favorable 
consideration due to hardship the company suffered in a delay caused by a biological 
agent threat.  The Jones Act waiver request was denied, so CSAV instead contracted with 
a U.S.-based shipping company to transport the discharged containers by barge from 
Charleston to Miami. 
Governmental officials indicated that no biological hazardous materials were 
found in the course of this incident.4 
                                                
3 The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, prohibits foreign-flagged vessels from 
engaging in shipping between U.S. ports. 
4 Leach, Peter T.  “NY Ship Security Threat a Lemon.”  Journal of Commerce Online.  9 Aug 04.  
(www.joc.com) 
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CHAPTER  
3 
Maritime Commerce and Container Shipping 
The Worldwide Shipping Industry 
Since the beginning of recorded history, the oceans and seas of the world have 
served to link commerce within and between nations.  From galleys trading goods among 
Greek city-states in antiquity, to multi-masted windjammers bringing Chilean nitrates to 
Europe at the turn of the twentieth century and to today’s huge tankers bringing Middle 
Eastern oil to feed the energy demands of North America, the transportation of goods by 
water has grown with, and remains the “life-blood” of, our global economy. 
Commercial shipping remains a rapidly growing transportation mode even today.  
3.87 billion tons of dry goods are forecast to be shipped by water worldwide in 2005, up 
from 3.4 billion tons in 2003 and 1.8 billion tons in 1980.  As larger ships are built, costs 
per ton shipped decline; these transportation efficiencies are a significant driver of global 
economic growth (Landon, 2004). 
The types of vessels employed for the shipping of goods today are generally one 
of four basic types.  Tankers carry liquid products such as oil, liquefied natural gas and 
styrene.  Bulk freighters, such as coal colliers, transport large quantities of loose goods, 
including grain, cement and iron ore.  Roll-on/Roll-off vessels, often referred to as RO-
ROs, are used to transport wheeled cargoes such as automobiles, trailers and military 
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tanks.  Container ships carry dry and liquid freight stacked in uniform steel containers 
within and on the decks of the vessel. 
Containerized Shipping 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the maritime community, and the most 
difficult to defend against, is the shipping container.  It’s just a steel 
box, 8 feet high, 20 to 48 feet long, but it’s used to transport what we 
wear, work, and play with and, potentially, a weapon of mass 
destruction (Bergeron, 2002). 
Germane to this research, container shipping is a relatively new mode of freight 
transportation.  Shipping containers are corrugated steel cubes which come in standard, 
prescribed sizes of 20, 40 or 45 feet in length.  The containers are truly multi-modal.  
They can be easily stacked aboard a ship, and craned to and from tractor-trailers or 
flatbed railcars.   
The capacity of containers ships are actually measured in the number of 
containers they can hold.  The industry’s standard unit of measure is a “twenty-foot 
equivalent unit” or TEU.  A 20-foot container is 1 TEU, while a 40- or 45-foot container 
is 2 TEUs.  The CSAV RIO PUELO has a capacity of 2,524 TEU (see Appendix 1), 
while today’s largest container ships have capacities in excess of 8,000 TEU (Institute for 
Shipping Economics and Logistics, 2004). 
Container shipping is the fastest growing segment of commercial shipping.  In 
1980 containers represented 6.3 percent of world traffic.  By [2003] they accounted for 
23.8 percent and this is expected to rise to 26.6 per cent … [to] 386.5 million TEU … 
[total in 2005] (Landon, 2004). 
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The ability to load and seal a container at its point of origin makes container 
shipping extremely resistant to theft and tampering in transit.  This attribute comes with a 
downside, however, as it is extremely difficult for ship’s crews and customs official to 
verify the contents of an individual container amidst the thousands carried aboard a 
typical ship.  Since containers rely upon their closed doors to provide structural integrity, 
it is literally impossible for a container stacked aboard a ship beneath two or more 
containers to be opened at sea for visual inspection. 
Compared to tankers and bulk freighters, delays and other governmental 
interventions involving container ships can lead to particularly extensive disruptions to 
supply chains.  Because a single ship can carry thousands of containers, holding hundreds 
of different types of freight from hundreds of different companies, a government 
homeland security intervention in response to the contents of one container necessarily 
affects all other containers on the ship in question.  A delay in or failure to discharge a 
cargo can have worldwide implications. 
 In contrast to the time- and labor-intensive handling of bulk cargoes, containers 
can literally be loaded, sealed and delivered door-to-door in a very efficient manner.  Port 
turnaround times of vessels have been reduced from 3 weeks to less than 24 hours 
(Batchelor, 1997).  As a result, many firms have been able to streamline operations and 
reduce costs, making for a highly competitive business environment to the benefit of 
consumers and the companies shipping consumer goods.  Manufacturers’ inventories 
have been drastically reduced as just-in-time delivery of components has become a reality.   
For example, Montana supermarkets are able to stock fresh grapes from Chile in the dead 
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of winter.  Unfortunately, these supply chain efficiencies make businesses’ bottom lines 
extremely susceptible to disruptions in the flow of goods. 
The infrastructure of the container shipping industry gives rise to another dynamic 
that magnifies the impact of disruptions in the flow of shipping.  For the industry to work 
most efficiently, railheads and trucking depots must be co-located at deep-water wharfs 
with huge gantry cranes.  The investment required to build these container terminals 
naturally gives rise to a limited number of transportation hubs, typically the world’s 
major ports.  Just as a security concern raised for a single container can halt a ship 
carrying thousands of other containers, a security incident aboard one ship can bring all 
port operations to a grinding halt.  And since major ports are usually in or near densely 
populated cities, a single security incident can affect businesses that are not directly 
involved in maritime commerce. 
Maritime Commerce in the United States 
A terrorist incident in one of our critical ports would have a serious 
and long-lasting impact on global shipping, and the global 
economy…To quantify the risk in terms of economic perspective, a 
major [U.S.] port closure for one month is estimated to cost $60 billion 
(U. S. Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2004 Report, 2004). 
The U.S. Department of Transportation has dubbed the Nation’s network of ports, 
internal waterways, federal maritime navigation systems and intermodal connections as 
the U.S. Maritime Transportation System, or simply MTS.  The MTS sees roughly 7,500 
foreign vessels call upon U.S. ports each year, discharging and loading over 2 billion tons 
of freight and 3 billion tons of oil.  A large portion of the freight handled by the MTS 
arrives in the approximately 6 million shipping containers, like those aboard the RIO 
PUELO, that are offloaded each year (U.S. Coast Guard Publication 3-01, 2002). 
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In the most recent statistics available, merchandise trade valued at $807.1 billion 
($604.6 billion in imports; $202.5 billion in exports) moved by maritime vessels between 
U.S. and foreign seaports in 2003 (U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2003).  In 2002, the 
U.S. imported goods valued at $1,260.7 billion and exported goods valued at $713.1 
billion.  “United States ports handle over 95 percent of United States overseas trade. The 
total volume of goods imported and exported through ports is expected to more than 
double over the next 20 years” (U.S. Congress MTSA, 2002, §101(2)).  It is important to 
note that these values do not include goods which transit into and out of U.S. ports 
without being offloaded; in the case of the RIO PUELO, only 456 (24.8%) of the 1,084 
containers aboard the ship were scheduled to be offloaded in the Port of New York/New 
Jersey.  
As mentioned in the in the discussion of worldwide shipping trends above, the 
United States is also moving toward a consolidation of transportation infrastructure that is 
creating critical hubs within the major ports.  “The top 50 ports in the United States 
account for about 90 percent of all the cargo tonnage. Twenty-five United States ports 
account for 98 percent of all container shipments” (U.S. Congress, MTSA, §101(5)). 
The RIO PUELO case specifically involved containerized shipping.  In parallel 
with the rest of the world, inbound and outbound container shipments in the United States 
increased 86 percent between 1992 and 2002 (U. S.  Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
2004).  Because of rapid domestic and international growth in this method of 
transportation, combined with an increasingly globalized world linking first-world 
businesses with low-cost labor and raw materials from developing countries, any 
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governmental intervention that slows container shipping can cause grave disruptions in 
the Nation’s commercial supply chains. 
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CHAPTER  
4 
The U.S. Coast Guard and Homeland Security 
A Brief History of the U.S. Coast Guard and Commercial Shipping 
Be it further enacted, That the President of the United States be 
empowered to cause to be built and equipped, so many boats or 
cutters, not exceeding ten, as may be necessary to be employed for the 
protection of the revenue…5 
Like most business-government relationships, the involvement of the U.S. Coast 
Guard in the regulation of commercial shipping has evolved over time; the relationship 
continues to evolve today.  While numerous Federal, state and local agencies each have 
unique responsibilities for oversight of shipping and goods importation (e.g., U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Custom and Border Protection, local port authorities, 
etc.), a review of the development of the U.S. Coast Guard’s port security program is 
illustrative of laws adapting to the changing needs of businesses and the prevailing 
assumptions of public good. 
Since its inception as the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the U.S. Coast 
Guard has been charged with ensuring that customs duties were collected on all goods 
imported by ship.  The duties of this small maritime service remained largely unchanged 
until it was charged by the Congress in 1888 with managing the movement and 
anchorage of vessels within New York harbor.  The service was later charged with the 
responsibility of establishing and overseeing anchorages for vessels in the Nation’s ports 
through the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1915.    
                                                
5 Statute II, Chapter 35, Section 62; 2nd Session of the First Congress, August 4, 1790. 
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A parallel path of the U.S. Coast Guard’s history began roughly fifty years after 
the creation of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service when the Congress, facing a growing 
number of fatalities from fires and boiler explosions aboard ships, enacted a law charging 
the Justice Department to "provide better security of the lives of passengers on board of 
vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam"6 on July 7, 1838.  Even at this early date, 
Congress was reluctant to enact rigorous safety standards upon commercial shipping out 
of concern for the possibility of harming the economically-vital steamboat industry (U.S. 
Coast Guard Fifth Dimension Newsletter, 1974).   
Domestic steamship inspection responsibilities were then transferred to the 
Treasury Department by the Steamboat Act of May 30, 18527, which also formally 
established supervisory inspectors, delineated geographic regions of responsibility, and 
provided for the appointment of local inspectors.  As its responsibilities grew to include 
licensing of mariners, the organization was named the Steamship Inspection Service in 
1871.  The service was subsequently transferred to the newly-formed Department of 
Commerce and Labor in 1903. 
In 1915, the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service and U.S. Lifesaving Service were 
merged within the Department of the Treasury to become the U.S. Coast Guard.   
Within the Department of Commerce in 1932, the Steamship Inspection Service 
was merged with Bureau of Navigation (created in 1884 for the regulation of merchant 
seamen) and renamed the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation.  Safety 
                                                
6 5 Stat. L., 304 
7 10 Stat. L., 1852 
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responsibilities for the Bureau were expanded by Public Law 6228 in 1936 and the 
Motorboat Act of 1940.  These laws required structural fire protection on passenger 
vessels, required the Bureau’s pre-construction approval of plans for passenger vessels, 
and established safety requirements for every vessel propelled by machinery and not 
more than 65 feet in length (U.S. Coast Guard Fifth Dimension Newsletter, 1974).  
In the midst of World War I, the Espionage Act of 1917 first codified the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s responsibilities for port security.  In addition to shifting control of 
anchorages and movements of vessels from the Army Corps of Engineers to the U.S. 
Coast Guard, the Act charged the service with the authority and responsibility of 
preventing sabotage of merchant vessels, controlling movements of people on or near 
vessels, and safeguarding waterfront property.  Beginning in New York, the local Coast 
Guard commander tasked with these significant responsibilities was dubbed the “Captain 
of the Port” or COTP.  Even after the conclusion of World War I, U.S. Coast Guard 
COTPs continued to oversee peacetime port activities throughout the Nation (Browning, 
n.d.).   
When Prohibition was enacted in the 1920’s, the U.S. Coast Guard mounted its 
first serious effort to combat major smuggling operations.  Although Prohibition was 
eventually repealed and the U.S. Coast Guard’s “Rum War” has been largely forgotten, 
the precedent had been established that would make the service the maritime leader in the 
“War on Drugs” from the 1970s until today. 
                                                
8 49 Stat. L., 1380 
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Prior to direct United States involvement in World War II, the U.S. Coast Guard 
was charged with inspecting merchant ships of belligerent nations to ascertain whether 
they were carrying offensive armaments; over 4,000 such boardings had taken place by 
June 1941 (Johnson, 1987).  As war crept closer to the western hemisphere, the anti-
sabotage and port control provisions of the 1917 Espionage Act were again enacted in 
June 1940 and remained in effect through the end of the conflict.  Expanding the 
capabilities, authorities and responsibilities of the service, President Roosevelt 
temporarily transferred the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation to U.S. Coast 
Guard control in February 1942.  This merger was made permanent on July 16, 1946. 
The Cold War was a further catalyst to the expansion of U.S. Coast Guard 
oversight of commercial shipping within the Nation’s ports.  Facing the specter of Soviet 
merchant ships secreting nuclear devices, the Magnuson Act of August 1950 allowed the 
president to invoke the port security provisions of the 1917 Espionage Act whenever “he 
deemed it advisable to ensure the safety of the country” (Johnson, 1987, p. 281).  During 
the war, the U.S. Coast Guard’s port-security mission grew through various laws and 
agreements to give the service the following broad responsibilities:  
• Control of anchorage and movement of all vessels in port.  
• Issuance of identification cards and the supervision of access to 
vessels and waterfront facilities.  
• Fire-prevention measures including inspections, recommendations 
and enforcement.  
• Firefighting activities, including use of fireboats, trailer pumps and 
other extinguishing agents.  
• Supervision of the loading and stowage of explosives and military 
ammunition.  
• Boarding and examination of vessels in port.  
• Sealing of vessels' radios.  
• Licensing of vessels for movement in local waters and for departure.  
• Guarding of important facilities.  
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• Enforcement of all regulations governing vessels and waterfront 
security.  
• Maintenance of water patrols.  
• General enforcement of federal laws on navigable waters and other 
miscellaneous duties. (Browning, n.d.) 
After nearly 177 years under the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Coast 
Guard was transferred intact to the Department of Transportation in April 1967.  Over the 
remaining decades of the twentieth century, the U.S. Coast Guard’s merchant vessel 
regulation authorities and responsibilities grew largely as a result of maritime pollution 
disasters:  The TORREY CANYON grounding and oil spill of 1967 led to the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act (PWSA)9 of 1972, and the EXXON VALDEZ grounding and oil 
spill of 1989 resulted in the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)10 of 1990 (Duff, 2001). 
The PWSA requires the U.S. Coast Guard to promulgate regulations regarding the 
“design, construction, alteration, repair maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel 
qualifications and manning of vessels . . . necessary for the increased protection against 
hazards to life and property, for navigation and vessel safety and for enhanced protection 
of the marine environment.”11  OPA then created the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
(OSLTF), to be administered by the U.S. Coast Guard, and set forth the responsibilities 
for companies to certify their financial means (through insurance, assets, etc.) to fund the 
clean-up of oil spill caused by their operations. 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Congress enacted the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)12 of 2002.  MTSA is arguably the biggest 
expansion of U.S. Coast Guard responsibilities and authorities since the Espionage Act of 
                                                
9 33 USC Chapter 25 
10 P.L. 101-380 
11 46 USC §3703(a) 
12 P.L. 107-295 
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1917.  Among its many provisions, MTSA required the service to provide oversight of 
security and response plans prepared by shipping companies and port facilities; provided 
for the service to establish sea marshall and security teams to protect vessels, harbors and 
structures adjacent to the water; and authorized the service to expand its size to meet 
these new responsibilities.   
In March 2003, the U.S. Coast Guard was transferred to the newly-formed 
Department of Homeland Security.  Along with the Secret Service, the U.S. Coast Guard 
has remained organizationally intact amidst the 22 agencies that were brought together to 
form the new department.  In addition to driving change within the organization of the 
Federal government, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically illustrated 
the new challenges facing the U.S. Coast Guard and its longstanding mission of 
protecting the United States’ 95,000 miles of coastline and its commercial ports, which 
today number 361 (U.S. Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2004 Report, 2004).   
Homeland Security: Acknowledging the Challenges 
The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Border and  
Transportation Security, shall be responsible for the following: 
 
(1) Preventing the entry of terrorists and the 
instruments of terrorism into the United States. 
 
(2) Securing the borders, territorial waters, ports, 
terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea 
transportation systems of the United States, 
including managing and coordinating those 
functions transferred to the Department at ports 
of entry. 
· 
· 
· 
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(8) In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities, 
ensuring the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow 
of lawful traffic and commerce.13 
As can be seen above, the Department of Homeland Security has been 
deliberately challenged with the need to balance security with commercial efficiency.  
The importance of trade to the U.S. economy necessitates that all levels of government 
implement effective policy, backed with robust enforcement assets, to protect shipping 
from disruption or damage caused by terrorist organizations seeking to undermine 
western capitalism.  The conduct of such protection and security requirements placed 
upon industry cannot be so onerous, however, as to stifle the very economy that fuels the 
United States’ exceptional standard of living. 
As we saw in the attacks upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 
actual transportation assets, passenger aircraft in those cases, can be used as weapons.  
This is no less the case for merchant shipping vessels.  Hijacked by terrorists, a large ship 
could easily damage or destroy critical bridges or waterfront facilities.  The danger goes 
well beyond that of a simple, albeit large, collision.  A bulk freighter or tanker filled with 
ammonium nitrate or liquefied propane gas in malicious hands could become a floating 
bomb with the potential of immeasurable devastation to a major city.  In 1917, the 
accidental explosion of the French ammunition ship MONT BLANC in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, flattened the city, with estimates of 1,635 killed, 9,000 injured and $35 million in 
property losses.  The MONT BLANC was carrying 5,000 tons of explosives, a relatively 
small bulk cargo load by today’s standards.  (Johnson, 1987) 
                                                
13 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296), §402. 
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In addition to the threat of ships being used as weapons, today’s continuing 
growth in containerized cargo presents policymakers with a terrible conundrum.  The 
commercial advantage of containers moving quickly and securely from shipper to 
consignee provides a like advantage to terrorists and criminal organizations smuggling 
explosives or other hazardous materials into the United States.  As a direct means of 
terrorist attack, a cargo container is more than adequately sized to accommodate a nuclear 
device, a biological contagion or any other type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD).   
Despite the frightening possibilities raised, there is simply no easy answer to 
countering the threat posed by containers.  Each day an average of over 17,000 containers 
enter the United States (Bergeron, 2002).  With the largest container ships capable of 
holding over 8,000 twenty-foot containers, a weapon could be brought into a U.S. port 
within a container that is not even scheduled for discharge in the United States.  Today’s 
highly efficient supply chains require ships to discharge and onload containers with 
typically less than 24 hours in each port.  Inspecting each container being discharged in 
the United States is not only well beyond the capabilities of the Customs and Border 
Protection’s (CBP) roughly 7,500 inspectors, it would also create a huge bottleneck in the 
transportation system; historically, only two percent of containers entering the United 
States are internally inspected (Bergeron, 2002).  CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard and other 
Homeland Security agencies face one of their biggest challenges in accurately tracking 
and verifying containerized cargo without overly impacting business. 
Even if all incoming containers could be inspected pierside, the threats posed by 
the possibility of using merchant vessels as weapons and the delivery of a container-
borne WMD have necessitated the “pushing out” of the Nation’s borders.  With the goal 
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of assessing suspect vessels prior to their entering critical ports where catastrophic 
damage could be inflicted by a WMD, government agencies carefully assess known 
intelligence concerning inbound vessels and, if necessary, inspect vessels as far offshore 
as is practicable given government resources and the prevailing weather.  As mentioned 
earlier, inspections of container ships at sea are limited by the way in which containers 
are stacked.  From the business side of the issue, any time that commercial shipping is 
stopped, for whatever reason, the costs incurred go beyond just the delay in business.  
Crews must still be paid throughout the delay.  Further delays may also result, as ports 
are forced to reschedule moorage and logistics (e.g., pilotage, cargo handling, refueling 
and re-provisioning).  As in the case of the RIO PUELO, some goods may spoil or 
otherwise become unusable.   
Developing appropriate policies and protocols for effectively mitigating these 
transportation system threats in a way which is commercially viable will require a long-
term, dedicated partnership of business and government.  All parties must realize that 
another successful terrorist attack within the United States on the scale of the World 
Trade Center is absolutely unacceptable; no mitigation of business expenses through 
relaxed security laws could offset such loss of life and erosion of the national sense of 
security.  Any possible solutions likely lie within the emerging field of strategic risk 
management. 
For the present, the U.S. Coast Guard, in its most recent guidance for conducting 
Homeland Security missions, acknowledges the challenge of balancing security with 
commerce efficiency.  “The Coast Guard recognizes that … the economic and strategic 
importance of major American ports and waterways precludes delays in the supply chain, 
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and frequent or long closures except for the most extraordinary circumstances” (U.S. 
Coast Guard Publication 3-01, 2002, p 5).  One of the five strategic objectives set forth 
by the service in it Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security is to “Protect the U.S. 
Marine Transportation System while preserving the freedom of the maritime domain for 
legitimate pursuits” (U.S. Coast Guard Publication 3-01, 2002, p 19).   
The Port of New York and New Jersey is clearly one of the most economically 
important of the U.S. ports and it is the stage upon which the RIO PUELO incident 
played out, illustrating many key issues faced by the government in balancing Homeland 
Security with the efficient flow of maritime commerce.  The RIO PUELO was stopped as 
local, state and Federal agencies were in the midst of preparing for the Republican 
National Convention to be held August 27-31, 2004.  This convention, where President 
George W. Bush was anticipated to be nominated as the party’s presidential candidate for 
the November 2004 national election, was clearly a high-profile event that could have 
been the target of a terrorist attack. 
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CHAPTER  
5 
Sources of Costs 
One of the goals of this research is to explore the broad base of business costs, 
direct and indirect, incurred when the RIO PUELO was delayed and its cargo of 
Argentine lemons destroyed.  As I conducted my research and uncovered the numerous 
firms affected by the RIO PUELO incident, I was at the same time discovering how 
varied were the nature of these costs.  In this section, I outline the categories of costs that 
arise when a large container ship is delayed. 
Clearly, the most apparent cost was the loss of the Argentine lemons, suspected of 
being tainted with a biological agent, which were frozen, fumigated and ultimately 
incinerated.  Far more subtle and indirect would be any increase in costs the Canadian 
lemon importer incurred after having to reorder lemons, assuming there was still a 
demand for the produce.  Of course, it is possible that the cost of lemons could have 
decreased during this incident, in which case the incident would have provided a windfall 
to the lemon importer. 
The delay of the RIO PUELO at anchorage from July 31st until August 6th 
presents numerous costs.  The RIO PUELO’s original voyage plan did not include 
anchorage, so additional pilotage expenses were likely required to cover the anchorage 
and any other ship handling until the vessel arrived inport.  Throughout the unplanned 
six-day anchorage the wages of the master and crew continued to be paid, and fuel and 
provisions continued to be consumed by the ship’s generators and crew, respectively.  A 
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portion of the fuel consumed was for the ship’s generators to provide power to the 
numerous refrigerated containers aboard the RIO PUELO.  It is also possible that services 
had to be arranged for the offload of solid waste, sewage and waste oil, tasks significantly 
more expensive at anchorage than were the ship moored pierside.  Since the RIO PUELO 
was allowed to continue on her voyage on August 7th, after the one day in port required to 
safely offload the lemon-filled containers, it is unlikely that the ship incurred any 
extraordinary costs above those linked directly to the suspect containers. 
The delay of cargo contained within non-targeted containers aboard the RIO 
PUELO is another source of costs in this incident.  Modern container shipping requires 
heavy-lift crane equipment, and the stability of the container ship must be accounted for 
as the ship is loaded or offloaded.  The containers containing the lemons were stowed in 
various locations and under other containers throughout the ship in this case.  For these 
reasons, there was no cost-effective way to safely offload the suspect containers at the 
offshore anchorage and to allow the RIO PUELO to continue on its voyage. 
Additional costs were incurred because the Port of New York & New Jersey 
lacked a dedicated remote offload and disposition site, which required an interruption of 
otherwise scheduled shipping that must be delayed or rerouted.  This is not an issue 
isolated to the Port of New York & New Jersey.  Currently, in most ports, existing 
commercial pier space must be used to conduct the controlled offload and final 
disposition actions, whether they entail further inspection, fumigation and/or 
decontamination.  Whether these costs would be borne by commercial interests or 
governmental agencies has yet to be determined. 
 35 
Along with commercial pier space, training must be provided to select 
longshoremen to operate cargo transfer equipment in a high-risk potentially contaminated 
environment.  Whether training would be provided to a select group of longshoremen in 
each port, or to mobile teams serving different regions of the country, successful 
implementation and funding of such an initiative will clearly involve negotiations among 
numerous Federal, state and local government agencies, as well as businesses and labor 
unions.  These costs, unless covered through government grants, would also likely be 
shifted to the companies whose goods are being transported and then to customers and 
end users. 
Related to requisite training for personnel, costs can also be expected for any 
delays driven by the availability of equipment needed for testing, cargo-handling, 
decontamination and the like.  Of course, stationing such response equipment in or some 
or all of the Nation’s 361 ports comes with its own up-front costs, which again would 
have to borne by businesses, governments or both. 
Because of the complex maze of admiralty law, hazardous material response 
statutes and homeland security authorities that must be actively navigated as the situation 
evolves, businesses and other organizations might retain one or more law firms to provide 
counsel throughout the case.  Similarly, to avoid any possible negative impact upon 
future business and company shareholder value caused by the situation’s alleged tie to 
terrorist action, businesses also may employ the services of public and media relations 
firms. 
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Perhaps the most concerning of indirect costs, any U.S. Captain of the Port 
(COTP) Order that may be issued to facilitate the handling of a ship suspected of carrying 
a WMD or hazardous substance could interfere with, or even halt, the conduct of routine 
commercial operations within a port.  Such a disruption could impact hundreds of 
industrial supply chains. 
Many of the expenses incurred in this incident are subject to reimbursement by 
shipping and freight insurance.  Another cost that should be expected, therefore, would be 
an overall rise in insurance rates, especially after repeated incidents of ship delays and 
cargo interdiction. 
Finally, businesses involved in such a hazardous material incident (potential or 
real) involving governmental response can expect to reimburse government expenditures 
through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA).  Similar to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), these so-called 
“Superfund” acts require shippers to possess a Certificate of Financial Responsibility14, 
or COFR, certifying that the shipper has the financial means to cover liability of “all costs 
of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an 
Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan” and “any other necessary 
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan.”15  Costs incurred in this category include Federal hazardous material response 
teams, testing equipment, Port Authority police overtime and actual handling of the 
suspect material (e.g., isolation, decontamination, destruction, etc.). 
                                                
14 Title 42, Chapter 103, Subchapter I, §9608, U.S. Code 
15 Title 42, Chapter 103, Subchapter I, §9607, U.S. Code 
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CHAPTER  
6 
Companies and Costs 
Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores (CSAV) 
CSAV is a multi-national shipping company based in Santiago, Chile.  CSAV is 
publicly held; shares are traded on Chile’s principal stock market, Bolsa de Santiago, 
under the ticker name VAPORES.  The market capitalization of CSAV was $1.7B ($US) 
as of January 3rd, 2005.16 
I was able to obtain information on CSAV’s expenses resulting from the RIO 
PUELO incident through several telephone interviews and electronic questionnaires 
presented to the vice president for operations at CSAV’s New Jersey regional office.  
Throughout the incident, CSAV appears to have acted quite cooperatively with 
government agencies.  PANYNJ, Oskar Wehr and Maher Terminals all confirmed the 
CSAV was billed for all ship charter and port service expenses associated with the delay 
of the RIO PUELO’s voyage, as well as the handling of the five suspect containers from 
their discharge until they were returned empty to CSAV for repairs and return to service.   
Direct Costs17 
CSAV began to accumulate costs related to the suspect lemons as soon as the RIO 
PUELO anchored near the Ambrose light tower on July 31st, 2005.  For the six days that 
                                                
16 Datastream Advance database, Thompson Financial, January 3, 2005. 
17 All costs in this chapter are in $US. 
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the RIO PUELO remained at anchor CSAV was still responsible for paying charter fees 
to Oskar Wehr despite the fact that the ship was unable to carry out its revenue-
generating operations.  These costs, based upon a flat daily charter rate of $17,500, 
totaled $105,000.  While the charter fees did include wages and provisions for the RIO 
PUELO’s crew, they did not include $4,950 in fuel consumed during the six days at 
anchor; these fuel costs were borne by CSAV. 
Once the RIO PUELO arrived at Berth 50 of Mayer Terminal on August 6th, 
CSAV began to incur several of the expenses of handling the five containers of suspect 
lemons.  Renting a flat barge upon which the containers were placed for transportation to 
Berth 34 and subsequent fumigation cost the shipping company $13,765.  For an 
additional $7,434, the barge was modified to safely accommodate the five lemon 
containers plus a sixth container holding equipment for the fumigation.  The discharge of 
the containers from the ship cost $5,232, while the loading and unloading of the 
containers from the barge cost CSAV $2,256.  While at Berth 34, the barge required 
power for the refrigerated containers and the fumigation equipment.  This was provided 
by CSAV generator sets transported to the berth at a cost of $1,500, with a total cost of 
fuel of $1,049 for the five days in which the containers were kept on the barge.  Note that 
while these costs were borne by CSAV, the actual fumigation and final disposition 
operations were coordinated by government officials. 
Although CSAV did not incur any direct costs when the lemons were ultimately 
destroyed, the shipping company did have to pay $12,248 to make repairs to, and $2,000 
to survey, the five containers which held the lemons after the containers were returned to 
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CSAV.  The containers had had several accesses cut into their sides to allow for the 
attachment of fumigation ducting.   
Indirect Costs 
Not surprisingly, CSAV realized that the unusual nature of the RIO PUELO 
incident was going to require careful handling to ensure that the company’s legal rights 
were protected and that the company’s reputation was not tarnished by the circumstance 
of having the five suspect containers on a CSAV liner.  As a result, CSAV retained a 
lawyer specializing in maritime transportation security at a cost of $2,000, and contracted 
for $3,500 worth of services from a media expert.  As part of the company’s efforts to 
allay the concerns of consignees shipping with CSAV, and to dispel rumors surrounding 
the containers of lemons which had arrived aboard the RIO PUELO, emails and letters 
were proactively sent to all clients (see Appendix 6). 
The six-day delay of the RIO PUELO created another problem for the shipping 
company in addition to the delay in the delivery of the remaining cargo aboard the ship.  
The company’s next liner was only one day behind the RIO PUELO, seriously 
confounding the routine of weekly arrivals of CSAV container ships in the U.S. East 
Coast ports.  To get the system back “on-track,” the shipping company had to either 
accelerate the RIO PUELO back onto her original schedule or push back all of the ships 
in the circuit approximately six days.  Not surprisingly CSAV chose the former course, 
requiring the RIO PUELO to skip a port to get back on its original schedule.  The 
company looked ahead to Miami, the RIO PUELO’s third port call after Port Elizabeth, 
as the port to be possibly skipped.  This would give CSAV time during the RIO 
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PUELO’s port calls in Norfolk and Charleston to make arrangements for the cargo 
scheduled for discharge in Miami. 
It was sometime during the final days of the RIO PUELO incident that CSAV 
informally approached Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to inquire as to the 
possibility of a Jones Act waiver for the Miami cargo.  The plan CSAV had in mind 
would involve discharging RIO PUELO’s Miami containers in Charleston, and then 
having the next CSAV liner onload the containers while in Charleston for delivery in the 
following port of Miami.  Although I was unable to confirm such discussions with CBP, 
CSAV’s representative to the daily Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) meetings 
remembered asking a CBP representative about the possibility of a Jones Act18 waiver to 
have allow a foreign-flagged vessel onload a cargo in a U.S. port for delivery in another 
U.S. port.   
CSAV cited Force Majeure its grounds for the waiver, a long-standing maritime 
principle meaning “greater force.”  Originally, Force Majeure allowed a ship to enter a 
country’s territorial waters to escape extreme weather or to cope with a serious 
mechanical breakdown without subjecting the ship to seizure or enforcement of the 
country’s laws.  In this case, CSAV pointed out that no harmful substances had been 
detected among the lemons.  The delay in the RIO PUELO’s schedule was due to the 
compelling but ultimately unnecessary actions of a “greater force” (i.e., the U.S. 
government), and that CSAV could reasonably expect some accommodation in U.S. 
                                                
18 The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, prohibits foreign-flagged vessels from 
engaging in shipping between U.S. ports. 
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maritime law (i.e., the Jones Act prohibition on foreign-flagged vessels shipping goods 
between two U.S. ports). 
During the initial discussion concerning the possibility of a waiver to the Jones 
Act, the CPB official indicated that he would look into the likelihood of approval but that 
he “doubted very much that such a waiver would be forthcoming since it was a 
business decision [for the RIO PUELO] to bypass Miami and not a Force Majeure 
situation.”  At a subsequent daily FOSC meeting, the CBP official verbally advised 
CSAV that a waiver request would not be approved.  
Wishing to avoid any further delay in the Miami cargo, CSAV never made a 
formal Jones Act waiver request in writing.  Instead, CSAV paid $45,998 to a U.S. 
shipper to barge 110 containers from Charleston to Miami.  The RIO PUELO then 
returned to its original schedule. 
Intangible Costs 
As mentioned above, CSAV both hired a media expert and took proactive actions 
to communicate with its clients to help minimize any damage to the company’s 
reputation as a result of the RIO PUELO incident.  Through the course of my interviews, 
CSAV officials indicated that they knew of no instances of the company losing business 
or of CSAV receiving negative media attention related to the RIO PUELO. 
Since CSAV is a publicly held company I was able to look for some external 
evidence of impacts to the shipping company from the RIO PUELO incident.  The 
performance of CSAV’s stock over the course of 2004, particularly in comparison to the 
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Chilean General Price Index, shows no discernable dramatic change in the share price 
which might be linked to the delay of the RIO PUELO (See Table I). 
TABLE I: CSAV Stock Performance Composite19 
DATASTREAM EQUITIES 03/01/05 18.45
VAPORES
Geography Code - CL   Industry Group - SHPNG
Local Code - CH3203560 Exchange - Santiago
Mnemonic - CL:VPR
 Sector - TRNSP
Current Price    1360.00 30/12/04
12 Mth Range High    1450.00  2/12/04
Low     725.00 19/ 1/04
Price Change 1mth 3mth 12mth
(CE)     0.5%     7.2%    76.6%
(U$)     4.0%    16.3%    84.3%
Relative to IGPAGEN
    1.3%     4.0%    44.2%
Market Value (CE)  1000748M
Adjusted to (U$)  1782.91M
Fin.Yr LocStd I/B/E/S
12/03 09/04
EPS   67.3   95.5
PE  20.2  14.2
PE Rel.    84.2%
P/Cash  15.15 (%=Rel to DS Index)
Dividend Rate (CE)    32.82
Dividend Yield     2.41
Dividend Cover      2.9
Div Last Fin Year    25.12
Last Div Paid  N/A
Pay Date      N/A
(CE) 12/01 12/02 12/03
Total sales    1105B    1155B    1463B
Pre-Tax Prof.   22872M  36202M  56873M
Publ. EPS   22.57   34.47   67.32
Cash EPS   37.54   62.17   89.76
Mkt to Bk Val    0.78    0.65    1.68
ROE (%)    5.99    7.94   13.70
No. Shares in Issue       735844(000s)
Volume    173.5(000s)
Percentage of free float           22%
Volatil ity       11
Beta    1.232
Correlation 0.555
Price and Index (rebased)
J F M A M J J A S O N D
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VAPORES
CHILE GENERAL (IGPA)  (PI)
Source: DATASTREAM    
 
At worst, it is possible that CSAV’s dramatic upsurge at the end of September 
would have occurred earlier in the absence of the RIO PUELO incident, although there is 
no apparent evidence to support this possibility. 
                                                
19 Datastream Advance database, Thompson Financial, January 3, 2005. 
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Reimbursement 
CSAV was partially successful in seeking reimbursement of expenses incurred as 
a result of the RIO PUELO incident.  Like any shipping company, CSAV carries several 
types of insurance to cover the broad variety of contingencies that could arise from theft, 
labor problems and severe weather at sea.  The three major policies carried by CSAV 
include: 
P&I (Personal & Indemnity) Club – Hull and machinery liability 
claims. 
P&I Club – In-transit cargo liability claims. 
TT Club - Liability for cargo while in terminals and other shore 
facilities. 
Strike Club – Coverage for losses during interruptions in operations 
due to labor problems, etc. 
All three of these policies include deductibles. 
CSAV submitted a claim against the Strike Club coverage on September 28, 2004.  
The Strike Club agreed to cover costs of the charter fees for the RIO PUELO over the six 
days at anchor, less the policy’s deductible, providing a total reimbursement of $87,500 
on October 15, 2004.  While the Strike Club did agree to cover this incident in the spirit 
of uncontrollable interruption in operations, the settlement did state that this incident was 
a “unique accommodation” and that the policy may not cover similar incidents in the 
future.   
CSAV submitted no further insurance claims, and no liability claims where made 
against CSAV regarding the RIO PUELO incident as of the time of this research. 
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Cost Summary 
In total, CSAV appeared to incur $276,932 in expenses as a result of the RIO 
PUELO incident, $87,500 of which was eventually reimbursed.  These costs do not 
include any request for reimbursement which the U.S. government may make against 
CSAV for the costs of the response, costs which I will discuss in the chapter on 
government expenses. 
For a large company such as CSAV the two-month delay in the reimbursement of 
$87,500 was likely of little impact.  For a smaller company such as the fruit exporter I 
shall discuss in the next chapter, however, such a temporary loss of cash flow can have 
serious ramifications. 
Pampa Store 
Pampa Store is a small private company based in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
Pampa Store is privately held and managed by three partners, each holding an equal share 
in the company.  I was able to obtain information on Pampa Store’s expenses and indirect 
costs resulting from the RIO PUELO incident through a telephone interview with the 
partner who also serves as the sales manager of the company. 
Pampa Store exports citrus fruit and organic asparagus.  The firm has annual 
revenues of approximately $1 million20.  It employs a staff of eleven employees year-
around, plus additional temporary field workers during the growing season.  2004 was the 
first year that Pampa Store attempted to export produce to Canada.   
                                                
20 All costs in this chapter are in $US. 
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CDA Green Garden was the Canadian produce importer than contracted with 
Pampa Store for the fresh lemons that were eventually shipped on the RIO PUELO.  To 
fill the order Pampa Store located a lemon producer, Good Taste, to provide the desired 
amount of fruit.  To avoid paying internal Argentine taxes of as much as ten percent, 
Pampa Store decided to use Good Taste’s contract shipper, Real Frut S.A., to package the 
lemons and arrange the shipping.  Pampa Store then paid $40,000 to the lemon producer 
and $15,000 to Real Frut, S.A., who packaged the lemons and paid for CSAV shipping 
the containers aboard the RIO PUELO.  The terms agreed to with CDA Green Garden 
involved no up-front payments; the full price of the produce was due to Pampa Store 21 
days after delivery.  While the RIO PUELO was enroute to a Port Elizabeth,21 the 
contract for lemons was transferred to another Canadian firm, Apex Corporation.22 
Direct Costs 
Not surprisingly, the majority of Pampa Store’s direct costs is the $55,000 paid to 
Good Taste and Real Frut.  Pampa Store was expecting to sell the lemons wholesale for 
approximately $70,000, so the company also lost $15,000 in profits.  Additionally, once 
Pampa Store was notified of the delay of the RIO PUELO and the detention of the 
containers holding the lemons, the firm sent a company representative from Argentina to 
Port Elizabeth to work with government officials in the processing and final disposition 
of the suspect lemons.  The travel costs and required expenses for Pampa Store’s 
representative totaled $14,125. 
                                                
21 The containers that held the suspect lemons were to be discharged in Port Elizabeth, NJ, and then 
transshipped via land to Montreal, Canada. 
22 Because neither CDA Green Garden nor Apex Corporation responded to my queries, the terms of the 
contract transfer are unknown.  A CSAV operations official confirmed that because of the volatile prices 
and perishability of produce, shipments are frequently repriced and/or sold while in transit. 
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Indirect Costs 
Similar to CSAV, Pampa Store retained a lawyer specializing in maritime law to 
assist with governmental dealings and potential issues of liability.  As a result, Pampa 
Store paid $8,875 in legal fees. 
Having paid both Good Taste and Real Frut without realizing any revenues from 
planned sale of the lemons, Pampa Store experienced a serious cash flow problem is the 
middle of its busiest season.  As a result, Pampa store had to take out a one-year $50,000 
loan to pay its growers.  As a result of high rates of interest in Argentina, exacerbated by 
risks associated with the produce industry, Pampa Store had to pay $4,000 in fees and 
agreed to pay $6,000 in interest to secure this short-term loan.  
Pampa Store did not have the shipment of lemons insured, so Pampa Store 
experienced no impact to its insurance premiums. 
Intangible Costs 
Like CSAV, Pampa Store took immediate action to mitigate any negative impact 
on the company’s reputation resulting from the RIO PUELO incident.  At a small cost 
that was not disclosed, Pampa Store issued a report to all of its clients to inform them of 
the U.S. government’s actions regarding the suspect lemons and to re-assure them of 
Pampa Store’s strengths as a dependable fruit exporter. 
As mentioned above, 2004 was the first year that Pampa Store attempted to 
engage in trade with Canada.  The losses from the RIO PUELO incident, in combination 
with a in-transit dispute with Apex Corporation over the price of the lemons (Blustein 
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and Byrnes, 2004) have led Pampa Store to make the decision to suspend any further 
business with Canada for a least one year. 
While Pampa Store does not export citrus fruit to the United States, it does export 
organic asparagus to several U.S. produce importers.  Pampa Store’s concerns that its 
brand name might have been tainted by the RIO PUELO incident proved unfounded 
when the subsequent shipments of asparagus entered the U.S. unfettered by USDA23 
officials and were readily accepted by U.S. importers. 
Reimbursement 
As mentioned above, Pampa Store did not have the lemon shipment insured.  
Pampa Store was, however, partially successful in seeking reimbursement of expenses 
incurred as a result of the RIO PUELO incident.  The U.S. Coast Guard, under the 
provisions of the Military Claims Act24 offered a settlement of $84,125 to Pampa Store 
on January 14, 2005.  Pampa Store accepted the reimbursement on January 18, 
2005.  That settlement was deemed to cover the “cost of the lemons, shipping, and some 
administrative costs directly related to the destruction of the lemons.”  The legal fees 
were not covered.  I was able to confirm this reimbursement through the U.S. Coast 
Guard Headquarters Office of Claims and Litigation. 
                                                
23 U.S. Department of Agriculture 
24 10 USC §2733 
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Cost Summary 
In total, Pampa Store appeared to incur approximately $103,000 in expenses as a 
result of the RIO PUELO incident, $84,125 of which was eventually reimbursed.  Unlike 
CSAV, the loss of cash flow ended up costing Pampa Store $10,000. 
Real Frut, S.A. 
Real Frut is a small private fruit wholesaler and shipper based in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina.  I was able to obtain information on Real Frut’s expenses and indirect costs 
resulting from the RIO PUELO incident through a letter and a telephone interview with 
the majority partner and director of the company. 
Real Frut is approximately two years old and its annual revenues amount to 
approximately $500,00025.  Real Frut employs between 20 and 50 temporary workers, 
with the payroll varying on a seasonal basis.  The company contracts with fruit producers 
such as Good Taste at the beginning of the growing season.   
Direct Costs 
Because of the $15,000 payment received from Pampa Store, it does not appear 
that Real Frut incurred any direct costs as a result of the RIO PUELO incident. 
                                                
25 All costs in this chapter are in $US. 
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Indirect Costs 
Within the five containers aboard the RIO PUELO, the lemons were packaged in 
clearly labeled Real Frut boxes (see Figure 1).  This may explain why, unlike CSAV and 
Pampa Store, Real Frut apparently experienced serious negative effects upon its brand 
name as a result of the RIO PUELO incident.  At the time that the five containers of 
lemons from the RIO PUELO were being fumigated in Port Elizabeth, Real Frut had 
another three containers of lemons aboard a different container ship.  Upon arrival in the 
destination country, these three containers with an open bill of lading26, could not be sold 
to any fruit importers at their destination, presumably because of fears of contamination 
stemming from the U.S. governments response to Real Frut lemons aboard the RIO 
PUELO.27  The lemons eventually spoiled; as a result, Real Frut suffered a loss of 
approximately $21,000. 
                                                
26 An “open bill of lading” allows the shipper of a perishable product to transport goods to a destination 
while the best terms are obtained through negotiations with multiple potential buyers. 
27 Details on the ship that carried the additional three containers of lemons and the destination country were 
not provided by Real Frut and could not be obtained from other sources. 
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FIGURE 1: Real Frut Lemon Packaging28 
 
In the weeks that followed the RIO PUELO incident, business for the Real Frut 
brand name completely dried up.  The company was forced to suspend exports to Canada 
and Europe for lemons, orange and kiwis at the peak of the season.  To adapt to the 
situation, Real Frut had to sell its produce through competitors’ brand names, losing an 
unspecified margin of profits to those competitors.29  Eventually Real Frut introduced a 
new name brand under which it sells its produce today.30   
Real Frut also experienced unspecified losses and financial obligations as a result 
of purchasing contracts with fruit producers that it was unable to honor because of the  
                                                
28 Official U.S. Coast Guard photo 
29 Actual financial losses due to sales through other name brands were not provided by Real Frut. 
30 The brand name under which Real Frut sells produce today was withheld to protect the brand name’s 
reputation. 
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disruption in produce sales caused by the RIO PUELO incident.31  The approximate 
$21,000 loss associated with the refused lemons mentioned above also contributed to 
Real Frut’s inability to honor its contracts with producers. 
Intangible Costs 
As mentioned above, Real Frut incurred the immeasurable loss of its original 
brand name.  In a very real business sense, this represents the ultimate loss of reputation. 
Reimbursement 
Real Frut, as the shipper of the lemons, had the shipment insured for $42,847.32  
The insurance company, however, refused to make payment on the loss of the lemons due 
to a clause exempting losses caused by “intervention from a foreign state.” 
Cost Summary 
As a result of the RIO PUELO incident, Real Frut experienced a loss in excess of 
$21,000 and perhaps the greatest intangible loss of the businesses associated with this 
event. 
Container Shippers and Consignees 
My discussion of company expenses has so far centered on those firms that were, 
in some way, involved with the ordering or shipment of the five containers of lemons 
                                                
31 Actual losses and financial obligations resulting from unfulfilled contracts were not provided by Real 
Frut. 
32 The amount of insurance coverage provided by Real Frut was apparently greater than the $40,000 paid 
by Pampa Store due to produce price fluctuations, and to the value added by packaging and transportation 
prior to shipping. 
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which were alleged to be contaminated with a biological agent.  In this section I discuss 
those companies that had no connection to the suspect lemons other than having 
containers of cargo that were also being shipped on the RIO PUELO during the July-
August 2004 voyage.  At the time that the RIO PUELO was directed to anchor east of 
Sandy Hook, New Jersey, the container ship was laden with 1,084 containers, each 20 or 
40 feet in length.  The ensuing six-day delay in the ship’s mooring at Port Elizabeth 
impacted not only those containers that were aboard the ship, but also those that were 
staged for loading on the RIO PUELO on the original arrival date of July 31, 2004.  The 
delivery delay also cascaded onto ports following Port Elizabeth.  Since the RIO PUELO 
was not able to get back on schedule until CSAV had the ship skip Miami, the containers 
bound for Norfolk, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; Charleston, South Carolina; and 
Miami, Florida were all delayed approximately six days. 
The transportation of any cargo or freight usually involves two companies, the 
shipper and the consignee33.  Many consignees receiving goods by ship also contract with 
a third firm, called a shipping agent, to coordinate the arrival and any required 
transshipment of their cargoes.  Depending on the terms of the contract originally agreed 
upon for the shipment of a container’s cargo, any combination of these three parties could 
potentially incur an unusual expense due to the delay of the RIO PUELO’s schedule. 
Rather than attempting the Herculean task of contacting the shippers, consignees 
and shipping agents of all the containers aboard the RIO PUELO destined for Port 
Elizabeth, Norfolk, Baltimore, Charleston or Miami, I chose to focus on the 456 
containers destined for discharge in Port Elizabeth.  CSAV provided the cargo 
                                                
33 recipient 
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manifests34 for these 456 containers, from which I selected a sample 84 containers to 
study further (see Appendix 4).  Rather than choosing randomly, I selected containers 
that appeared to contain goods that were either perishable (e.g., fruits, seafood, etc.) or 
components needed for manufacturing firms (e.g., automotive components, electrical 
motors, etc.).  This methodology increased the likelihood that my research would reveal 
any containers whose shipper, consignee and/or shipping agent would have experienced 
an actual cost from the delay of the RIO PUELO.   
A total of 46 shippers, consignees and shipping agents were involved in the 
transport of the 84 selected containers.35  To each of these companies and agents I mailed 
a letter inquiring as to any costs experienced as a result of the delay of the RIO PUELO.  
The sampling yielded shippers, consignees and shipping agents based in six different 
countries in the Western Hemisphere, ranging from Canada to Argentina.  I had the 
letters (originally in English) translated into Spanish and Portuguese (see Appendix 5) to 
increase the likelihood of response.  
After three months, and along with follow-up telephone calls and emails, the 
letters generated responses from just two companies.36  In both cases, the firms indicated 
that they experienced no appreciable costs or losses as a result of the delay of their cargo.  
Cascaju Agroindustrial S.A., a shipper based in Ceara, Brazil indicated that none of the 
company’s clients filed any claims due to the delay of Brazilian cashews carried in a 20-
                                                
34 A cargo manifest is a brief listing of all the critical data concerning a ship’s cargo, including shipper, 
consignee, shipping agent (if any), weight, temperature requirements and a description of the goods. 
35 A single shipment often involves more than one container.  Of the 84 containers selected, the largest 
shipment numbered 32 containers. 
36 Telephone calls were placed and/or emails sent if such information was available on the cargo manifest.  
Four letters were returned due to address unknown.  Several companies contacted by telephone did not 
respond to the letter because they had no records or recollection of the delay. 
 54 
foot container aboard the RIO PUELO.  NATCO International Transport, a Miami, 
Florida-based company, was the consignee for a container of yerba matte arriving from 
Brazil aboard the RIO PUELO.  NATCO indicated that the six-day delay did not result in 
any unusual costs for the firm.  To determine if there were any costs further along the 
supply chain, NATCO contacted the food distributor to whom the yerba matte was sold 
to determine the distributor would be willing to participate in this research.  New Jersey-
based Triunfo Foods agreed to talk to me, indicating that the delay had caused no 
appreciable costs that they could find in their records.   
NATCO International Transport also recalled its Miami-bound cargo from the 
RIO PUELO that was further delayed by barging the containers from Charleston; no 
unusual expenses were recorded as a result of the delay in the containers arriving in 
Miami. 
Based upon the low response rates and the lack of unusual costs incurred by those 
firms that did reply to my queries of shippers, consignees and shipping agents, it is 
apparent that the six-day delay of the cargo bound for five U.S. ports did not result in 
appreciable widespread costs to businesses.  Clearly, the risk of costs would increase as 
the delay becomes longer and/or the number of ports affected grows. 
Companies Avoiding Incident-Related Costs 
Throughout my research, it became clear that many companies were able to avoid 
incurring any appreciable costs as a result of the RIO PUELO incident.  In some cases the 
firm’s organization or legal relation to other companies provided “shelter” from unusual 
costs; in other cases, firms reacted quickly to avoid such expenses.  Below I briefly detail 
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all those firms connected in some way to the RIO PUELO incident that did not incur 
costs, not including those shippers and consignees of containers aboard the RIO PUELO 
who were discussed in the last section.  The firms are listed in alphabetical order. 
Apex Corporation 
As mentioned in the section on Pampa Store, the contract for the five containers 
of lemons transferred from CDA Green Garden to Apex Corporation required no up-front 
payment; payment in full was due 21 days following delivery of the produce.  Since the 
lemons were never delivered, Apex Corporation appeared to incur no direct costs as a 
result of the RIO PUELO incident.  Apex Corporation did not respond to mail, telephone 
or email queries for this research, so there is no way of knowing if the firm experienced 
any indirect costs or reputation loss when the lemons did not arrive.   
CDA Green Garden 
CDA Green Garden, the Canadian firm which originally contracted with Pampa 
Store, was able to avoid any unusual costs related to the RIO PUELO incident because 
the contract required no up-front payment for the produce and CDA Green Garden 
transferred the contract to Apex Corporation before the RIO PUELO was directed to 
anchor off of Sandy Hook, New Jersey.  CDA Green Garden also did not respond to mail, 
telephone or email queries for this research. 
Good Taste 
Since Good Taste was paid in full for its lemons by Pampa Store, and the lemons 
were packaged in Real Frut boxes, the lemon producer avoided any unusual costs arising 
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from the RIO PUELO incident.  Both Pampa Store and Real Frut were able to confirm 
this avoidance of costs on the part of Good Taste. 
Maher Terminal 
Port Elizabeth-based Maher Terminal billed CSAV for all services provided when the 
RIO PUELO tied up and discharged the containers of suspect lemons to the barge, and 
for all logistics dealing with the fumigation and final disposition of the five containers.  
Since CSAV agreed to pay these expenses, Maher Terminal avoided incurring any 
unusual costs.  CSAV, the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ), Maher 
Terminal and the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) all confirmed CSAV’s 
payment of all logistics not provided or funded by government agencies.  
Oskar Wehr KG 
The German company which actually owns the container ship CSAV RIO 
PUELO was protected from costs involved with this incident.  The charter contract with 
CSAV places all liability for issues surrounding the ship’s cargo upon the charter.  Both 
CSAV and Oskar Wehr confirmed that Oskar Wehr avoided any unusual costs.  
Interestingly enough, if the RIO PUELO ran aground and began leaking its fuel oil, 
Oskar Wehr would likely be liable for the costs incurred. 
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CHAPTER  
7 
Government Expenses 
As a final portion of this research, it is important to look into the costs incurred by 
the Federal, state, local and port governments in handling the RIO PUELO incident.  In 
Chapter 7, I detailed many logistics costs paid by CSAV involving the handling of the 
containers of suspect lemons.  All other services required to safely resolve this case were 
undertaken by governmental agencies, completed directly by the agencies or through 
contractors paid by the government.  These services included assessing, safeguarding and 
fumigation of the containers, as well as the testing and final disposal of the lemons.  
Because of the nature of hazardous material and pollution response statutes within the 
United States, there is a possibility that CSAV could be liable for reimbursing 
government expenditures. 
CERCLA 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, was 
enacted by Congress on December 11, 1980. This law created a tax on 
the chemical and petroleum industries and provided broad Federal 
authority to respond directly to releases or threatened releases of 
hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the 
environment. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004) 
A U.S. Coast Guard official in the National Pollution Fund Center (NPFC) 
indicated that the government response to the RIO PUELO incident was funded by 
CERCLA37 because of the possible release of a hazardous biological agent.  Because the 
                                                
37 42 USC Chapter 103 
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incident occurred on a ship, the U.S. Coast Guard took the lead for coordinating and 
tracking government expenditures for the response.  All levels of government, including 
the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ), the New Jersey State Police 
and Department of Environmental Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) submitted their expenses through U.S. Coast 
Guard Activities New York to be reimbursed through the U.S. Coast Guard NPFC in 
Washington D.C.   
Direct Costs38 
Estimates of actual governmental costs were obtained from NPFC and Coast 
Guard Activities New York.  At the time of this research, these costs were in the process 
of final documentation before they could be submitted to EPA for reimbursement from 
the CERCLA Superfund.  Nonetheless, NPFC and Coast Guard Activities New York 
consider the estimates to be accurate to within a few thousand dollars.   
The U.S. Coast Guard, which first responded to the RIO PUELO incident, 
incurred $125,000 in expenses for personnel and equipment utilized in ship boardings, 
pierside and at the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) command center.  The service 
also incurred $25,000 in travel costs, for the Coast Guard National Strike Team39, and 
$100 in small administrative purchases.  Total costs for the U.S. Coast Guard are 
estimated at $150,100. 
                                                
38 All costs in this chapter are in $US.  Through a reciprocal agreement with the EPA, NPFC has been 
funding and accounting for governmental expenditures at all levels in the RIO PUELO incident.  Once the 
accounting is complete, EPA will transfer funds equal to the total governmental costs from the CERCLA 
Superfund to NPFC. 
39 The Coast Guard National Strike Team is a group of highly trained personnel who specialize in oil, 
hazardous material and pollution spill response.   
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EPA was the other Federal agency directly involved in the response to the RIO 
PUELO incident.  In addition to providing an around-the-clock FOSC representative and 
the agency’s Emergency Response Team (ERT), the EPA utilized its testing equipment 
and technical experts to test, and monitor the atmosphere in the vicinity of, the containers 
holding the suspect lemons.   The EPA’s total costs are estimated to be $240,000. 
Through the course of the RIO PUELO incident, the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey (PANYNJ) was extensively involved in planning and preparations for the 
eventual arrival of the container ship at Port Elizabeth on August 6th.  Discussions with 
PANYNJ officials indicated the majority of the agency’s costs were a result of overtime 
wages for port operations personnel providing enhanced, around-the-clock monitoring of 
the port and for Port Authority police providing security for the RIO PUELO and the 
suspect containers throughout their offload and fumigation, until the lemons were carted 
away and the containers returned to CSAV.  PANYNJ’s costs amounted to $92,559. 
The State of New Jersey also incurred costs in providing technical support and 
security for the RIO PUELO incident.  Expenses for New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection personnel amounted to $7,721 and the New Jersey State Police 
incurred personnel costs of $43,905, for a total state expenditure of $51,626. 
Finally, contractors who supported the response to the RIO PUELO incident 
amassed a total of $791,970 in costs.  Miller’s Launch provided ferry service for 
personnel to and from the RIO PUELO while at anchor for $3,470.  Fumigation of the 
containers by Sabre Technical Services cost $675,500.  Once the lemons were tested and 
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found to be free of any hazardous materials, Ken’s Marine provided disposal services for 
$113,000. 
Reimbursement 
Under the provisions of Section 9607 of CERCLA, CSAV could be held liable for 
up to $5,000,000 for “the full and total costs of response and damages, if … the release or 
threat of release of a hazardous substance was the result of willful misconduct or willful 
negligence…”40  In this way the U.S. Federal government, through the EPA and the 
Justice Department, is able to recover costs of government actions to prevent or respond 
to hazardous material incidents.  Without knowing the source and motivation behind the 
“unconfirmed anonymous report” which initiated the response to the RIO PUELO, the 
possibility remains that the Federal government could seek cost recovery for all levels of 
government which expended resources to safeguard the Port of New York & New Jersey 
from the potentially contaminated lemons. 
Another provision of CERCLA could serve to protect CSAV from assuming the 
responsibility for governmental costs.  The aforementioned “unconfirmed anonymous 
report” suggests the possibility that a third party intentionally mislead government 
officials that the five containers carrying the lemons contained an “unknown biological 
substance.”  CSAV could be absolved of financial responsibility of the governments’ 
response to the suspect lemons aboard the RIO PUELO if the company can show that 
threat of a hazardous material release was the result of “an act … of a third party … if the 
defendant [CSAV] establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that … he took 
                                                
40 42 USC §9607(c)(2) 
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precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the 
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts …”41  CSAV may not be 
required to mount such a defense; at this time it is not known whether the EPA will 
ultimately seek to recover the governments’ expenses from CSAV or the party 
responsible for the hoax, if that party is identified. 
Cost Summary 
In total, the RIO PUELO incident resulted in $1,326,254 in government costs 
which could be ultimately charged back to business to recover CERCLA Superfund 
expenditures.  The $84, 125 reimbursed to Pampa Store from the U.S. Coast Guard has 
not been included among these government expenses because it was not paid out of the 
CERCLA Superfund and hence is not subject to cost recovery charged to business. 
As mentioned at the outset of this thesis, this research is not intended in any way 
to suggest or determine liability for the RIO PUELO incident.  It is also by no means an 
authoritative source for U.S. laws concerning hazardous material responses.  This brief 
discussion on government expenses and CERCLA liability is simply meant to explain 
how governmental interventions can potentially translate into significant direct costs to 
businesses. 
                                                
41 42 USC §9607(b) 
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CHAPTER  
8 
Conclusions 
Totaling the direct expenses and cash flow disruptions of CSAV, Pampa Store, 
Real Frut and the U.S. government, the total measurable international costs of the RIO 
PUELO incident are at least $1,555,56142; the loss of cash flow is at least $171,625.  
Should the U.S. government seek to recover its response costs from CSAV, businesses 
will end up bearing the full $1.5 million in expenses.  If, on the other hand, the 
government chooses not to charge CSAV, either by choosing not to pursue recovery or 
by locating a third party liable for the incident, business expenses drop to $229,307 – just 
15% of the total costs.  The cash flow disruptions were borne fully by business.  These 
totals do not include the intangible costs detailed in the previous chapters, which 
nonetheless had significant repercussions for Pampa Store and Real Frut. 
Looking back on this case, it appears that $70 thousand worth of lemons actually 
cost $1.5 million.  In the end the actual cost of the destroyed lemons was reimbursed to 
Pampa Store by the government.  Hence the net financial impact resulted from business 
bearing part or all of the cost of the response, as well as from the tainting of business 
reputations due to involvement with alleged terrorist-like activities. 
At the outset I had anticipated that the total costs of the RIO PUELO incident 
would have been appreciably higher, in the $2 - $3 million range.  Because I had believed 
that more of the costs would have been directly paid by involved and affected businesses, 
                                                
42 All costs in this chapter are in $US. 
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I had also believed that a much higher percentage (i.e., greater than 50 percent) of the 
total costs would have been borne by business, rather than the preponderance of direct 
costs being paid by government. 
The most surprising result of this research was the apparent lack of costs 
experienced among the shippers and consignees of the 1,079 containers aboard the RIO 
PUELO which did not contain the suspect lemons.  In today’s global economy, with fresh 
produce traveling to marketplaces around the world and hundreds of manufacturing firms 
relying on just-in-time delivery of components from numerous countries, it stands to 
reason that delays in the supply chain could harm “downstream” businesses.  The factors 
involved in such harmful “ripple effects” of delaying a container ship likely include 
length of the delay, number of containers aboard and possibly even countries of origin 
and destination (i.e., the standard of living, degree of industrialization, complexity or 
perishability of exports, and need for just-in-time inventory all vary among countries). 
If the RIO PUELO can be considered a “model case” of a commercial shipping 
delay resulting from a governmental Homeland Security intervention, the costs to 
business may not be significant enough to warrant the attention of business executives 
and government policymakers, especially if the government does not typically seek to 
recover its response costs from business and the interventions are infrequent.  If, on the 
other hand, shipping disruptions are commonplace and/or increasing in frequency, the 
collective impact upon business may be substantial. 
With this latter thought in mind, I attempted to get a better sense of how frequent 
the U.S. government disrupts commercial shipping.  I contacted U.S. Coast Guard 
 64 
Headquarters and was informed that the U.S. Coast Guard does not currently track the 
number, or length, of delays to commercial shipping that result in from the service’s 
Homeland Security efforts.  While I was unable to locate any other U.S. government 
agency that tracked such data, a U.S. Coast Guard official at the National Pollution Fund 
Center anecdotally recalled that since September 11, 2001, there have been five to seven 
incidents per year where CERCLA funds have been required to bring National Strike 
Force personnel on-scene to evaluate a commercial ship that has been held offshore due 
to a suspected threat of a hazardous substance release.  The costs to businesses as a result 
of such interventions are unfortunately unknown. 
Long-Term Outlook 
All of the costs detailed within this research are examples of the economic impact 
business can experience as a result of governmental intervention in commercial shipping.  
Clearly every such intervention is different, with differing types and amounts of cargo, 
and delays ranging from minutes to days. 
While few people question the need for government to undertake such actions 
when safety and security of the nation’s ports and populace are at risk, there are serious 
potential economic implications that must be considered if such transportation 
interruptions are or become frequent.  In the short-term, consumers and end-users can 
expect costs for shipped goods, as well as products manufactured with shipped 
components, to rise.  In the long-term there arises the possibility of lost commercial 
business in some, or possibly all, major U.S. ports as shippers shift to smaller U.S. ports 
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or foreign ports.  Such a loss of business competitiveness in major U.S. ports could be 
devastating to the nation’s economy. 
The long-term outlook also depends on how the government chooses to approach 
Superfund expense recovery.  The degree to which businesses are held accountable for 
situations that are not directly in their control will have a profound effect on how the U.S. 
is viewed vis-à-vis the free flow of commerce.  The RIO PUELO case could potentially 
prove a watershed event for government cost recovery practices when and if more 
information is discovered regarding the origin and motivation behind the “unconfirmed 
anonymous report” that served as the trigger for the incident.  
This research has also demonstrated how such disruptions can be devastating to 
small businesses, both in direct expenses and loss of cash flow.  Larger businesses can 
presumably absorb such costs and cash losses, provided the number of such government 
interventions remains low.  Smaller businesses, especially those with seasonal business 
cycles, may not be able to survive such a loss of capital, even if temporary. 
Business/Government Partnering  
It is clear that both governments and businesses have a mutual interest in 
minimizing disruptions in commercial shipping.  What then can each do, separately and 
in concert, to contribute to this shared goal?   
z The U.S. government should gather, and maintain within a central database, 
the number, location and length of commercial shipping delays resulting from 
Homeland Security interventions.  This data will allow the government to 
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assess the impact of its actions upon businesses utilizing maritime 
transportation, and should also prove a useful metric for studies seeking to 
measure the effectiveness of Homeland Security initiatives. 
z Together with the shipping industry, the U.S. government should continue to 
develop uniform standards for cargo tracking and security.  These standards 
could include container point-of-origin cargo inspection protocols, RFID 
container seals and security requirements for container yards and moored 
ships.  Knowing the potential costs of shipping disruptions, businesses will 
have an incentive to invest an amount of capital (obviously an amount 
significantly less than the expenses of a possible shipping disruption) with the 
goal of lessening likelihood of such government interventions.  Of course, for 
such standards to be effective, they must be adopted on a global basis, through 
such multinational agencies as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
z Even with higher tracking and security standards, government must continue 
to gather, evaluate and disseminate intelligence pertaining to groups or 
individuals who would seek to tamper with cargo or shipping for illegal or 
malicious purposes.  Not only would such efforts, if effective, help 
government agencies to best utilize their limited inspection and response 
assets, but they would also reduce the possibility of expensive hoaxes as may 
have occurred in the case of the RIO PUELO.  Through sound intelligence, 
boats, aircraft, boarding teams and National Strike Team personnel can be 
alerted and positioned to counter the greatest anticipated threats.  Again, 
business can assist the government in intelligence gathering through 
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incentives or even through the intrinsic desire to safeguard the integrity and 
reputation of the shipping line. 
z The need for robust and transparent risk management is clear, but undertaking 
and managing such a system is clearly very challenging.  It is naïve to think 
that some algorithm could be developed which would inform government 
officials when potential business costs outweigh risks to persons and property.  
Such officials, Federal, state and local, must nonetheless be cognizant of and 
consider commercial interests in making their decisions. 
z When incidents such as the RIO PUELO do occur, government needs to 
explore ways to clearly announce the “held harmless” status of involved 
businesses that have maintained applicable standards and supported Homeland 
Security efforts.  I could find no evidence that the U.S. government made a 
concerted effort to communicate that there was no evidence of wrongdoing on 
the part of CSAV, Pampa Store or Real Frut after the lemons proved to be 
without hazardous contaminants.  Perhaps such a message was passed to mass 
media reporters, but to be effective such statements of “no wrongdoing” must 
be directly attributed to the government.  Such proactive policies will assist 
otherwise upstanding businesses from being negatively impacted by the 
stigma of being involved in an intervention.  Such public outreach through 
mass media outlets will, in turn, encourage businesses to report suspicious 
circumstances and occurrences, trusting that media exposure will bolster 
impressions of corporate responsibility. 
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z Finally, lawmakers and regulators should explore policies which can be 
implemented to minimize the financial impact on companies which are 
inappropriately or inadvertently involved in government interventions.  In the 
case of the RIO PUELO, the shipping firm’s expenses could have been 
slightly eased if an appropriate and expeditious policy was in place whereby 
the provisions of the Jones Act could have relaxed on a one-time basis, 
allowing the RIO PUELO to discharge its cargo in Charleston to be loaded 
and transported to Miami by another CSAV liner. 
Potential Area for Future Studies 
As mentioned at the outset of this thesis, my research focused solely providing an 
example of the costs associated with a government disruption of commercial shipping.  
Following the terrorist attack on the U.S. of September 11, 2001, the nation has been 
struggling with providing adequate levels of Homeland Security without encroaching on 
the attributes which make the U.S. stand out in the world – both economically and in the 
area of individual rights.   
There are many areas of study that logically follow from this research.  I 
specifically suggest further studies into how differing types of cargo result in greater or 
lesser degrees of financial impact to firms throughout the supply chain when their 
delivery is delayed.  Factors which play into the economic impact of specific cargoes 
should include monetary value, perishability (if applicable) and criticality to downstream 
manufacturing.  Once cargo is loaded, factors for assessing economic impact for a given a 
ship are principally the compilation of the cargo and the duration of the delay.  Through 
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such research, both government and business may be able to better anticipate the 
potential financial downside of a disruption in the voyage of a particular ship; knowledge 
of such a potential downside would be important information for any risk management 
tool employed by government officials responding to a perceived threat. 
Hopeful Guidance for the Way Ahead 
In closing, it is encouraging to note that ambitious guidelines have been set forth 
by U.S. legislators to guide agencies as they seek to balance national security with 
commercial efficiency.  The Maritime Transportation Security Act43 states that: 
 (13) It is in the best interests of the United States— 
· 
· 
· 
 (E) to invest in long-term technology to facilitate 
the private sector development of technology 
that will assist in the nonintrusive timely 
detection of crime or potential crime at United 
States ports; 
· 
· 
· 
 (G) to promote private sector procedures that 
provide for in-transit visibility and support law 
enforcement efforts directed at managing the 
security risks of cargo shipments. 
· 
· 
· 
It is my belief and sincere hope that this research will help to provide valuable 
information and perspective as the U.S. continues to develop and implement its 
Homeland Security policies. 
                                                
43 P.L. 109-175 
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APPENDIX 
A 
Container Ship CSAV RIO PUELO 
 
IMO Number: 9243239 
Call Sign: V7DR5 
Country of Registry: Marshall Islands 
Year Built: 2002 
Gross Tonnage: 25,703 
Vessel Owner: SBT Shipping Company Limited., Majuro, Marshall Isl. 
Manager/Operator: Oskar Wehr KG (GmbH &Co.), Hamburg 
Charterer: Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores (CSAV) 
Crew Size: 17 
 
MV Wehr Trave* 
 
Cellular Container Vessel 
 
Technical Data: 
 
Container Capacity: 2,524 TEU 
LOA: 208.16 meters 
Homo. Capacity @ 14t: 1,895 TEU 
Beam (molded): 29.80 meters 
Refrigerated Containers: 400 
Draft (scantling): 11.40 meters 
Deadweight: 33,600 tons 
Speed: 22.3 knots  
  
From Reederei Oskar Wehr website: www.wehrship.de/wehr/eng/mswehrtrave.html, 10 Feb 05 
 
*Launched as WEHR TRAVE in 2002.  Initially chartered as CCNI AYSEN.  Chartered 
in late 2003/early 2004 as CSAV RIO PUELO. 
 From Lloyd’s Register of Ships, 2004, Page 1061 
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APPENDIX 
B 
Typical Telephone/Email Cost Questionnaire 
 
1) Personal/Company Information: 
a) What is your full name? 
b) What is your position at Company X? 
c) How big of a company is Company X? 
i) Number of employees? 
ii) Annual revenue ($US/AR pesos/CLP/CAD)? 
d) Is Company X privately or publicly held? 
e) What is the best way to contact you?  Do you have an email address? 
2) Loss Information: 
a) What was the size of the lemon shipment (kilograms/boxes/number of lemons)? 
b) What was the total value of the lemons ($US/ARpesos/CLP/CAD): 
i) Wholesale? 
ii) Retail? 
c) Did Company X suffer any monetary loss from the destruction of the lemons? 
i) What was the monetary value of the loss ($US/AR pesos)? 
ii) Was any of the loss reimbursed?   
(1) How much ($US/ARpesos/CLP/CAD)? 
 72 
(2) By whom (e.g., insurance/government)? 
d) Did Company X suffer any other monetary loss (e.g., other produce delayed 
aboard the CSAV RIO PUELO)? 
i) What was the nature of the loss? 
ii) What was the monetary value of the loss ($US/ARpesos/CLP/CAD)? 
iii) Was any of the loss reimbursed?  How much?  By whom? 
e) Do you expect Company X’s insurance (if any) to be affected by this incident? 
i) Estimated amount of premium increase ($US/ARpesos/CLP/CAD)? 
f) Did this incident result in any indirect or non-monetary loss for Company X (e.g., 
loss of sales, reputation)? 
3) Related Company Information: 
a) What is Company X’s relationship with Company Y?   
b) Do you have a point of contact for Company Y? 
i) Name 
ii) Position 
iii) Address 
iv) Telephone 
v) Email 
c) To your knowledge, did Company Y suffer any loss? 
i) What was the nature of the loss? 
ii) What was the monetary value of the loss ($US/ARpesos/CLP/CAD)? 
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iii) Was any of the loss reimbursed?  How much?  By whom? 
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APPENDIX 
C 
Sample of Letter Sent to Firms Dealing in Suspect Lemons 
Sir/Ma’am: 
I am an active duty U.S. Coast Guard officer who is currently a Sloan Fellow at the Sloan 
School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
I am currently conducting research for a thesis which will document the total 
international business costs incurred when the United States government delayed the 
voyage of the container ship CSAV RIO PUELO off of the Port of New York & New 
Jersey from 30 July until 6 August 2004.  The purpose of my research is to use the case 
of the RIO PUELO to help inform decisions of homeland security policymakers and 
international business leaders by providing a comprehensive view of extraordinary 
business expenses caused by interruptions in shipping. 
In conducting my research, I am attempting to identify and contact every business 
involved with the shipping of the Argentine lemons aboard the RIO PUELO, including 
those distributors involved in the shipping and intended receipt of the produce.  I then 
hope to obtain a detailed list of extraordinary expenses incurred by each of these 
businesses as a result of the delay of the RIO PUELO and the destruction of the lemons.  
My thesis will then compile and explain the various costs across all of the involved 
businesses.  I am currently working with such organizations as Compañía Sudamericana 
de Vapores (CSAV) and the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey in conducting 
my research. 
I would greatly appreciate any information you can provide concerning costs incurred by 
Real Frut as a result of the destruction of the lemons and/or the delay of any other Real 
Frut produce aboard the RIO PUELO.  I would like to document these costs even if they 
have been reimbursed by insurance or other means. 
I can be reached at ejones@sloan.mit.edu, via telephone at (339) 234-1020 or (781) 453-
1250, or at the above address.  Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. 
Sincerely, 
CDR Eric C. Jones, USCG 
MIT Sloan Fellow, 2005 
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APPENDIX 
D 
Excerpts from CSAV RIO PUELO Cargo Manifest for 
Containers to be Discharged in Port Elizabeth, New Jersey 
CSAV Manifest 
 
Shipper 
COMPESCAL - COMÉRCIO DE PESCADO ARACAT 
RUA 2 DE NOVEMBRO, 1525 
VÁRZEA DA MATRIZ 
ARACATI-CE      BRAZIL 
CEP: 62.800-000 
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
Bobbery Enterprises Inc. 
2760 W. 81 Street 
Hialeah, FL  33016 
PHONE: 1 305 828-0828 
 
2 full containers and 2 partial containers of frozen shrimp (95K lbs) and rock lobster tails 
(20K lbs)  (Bobbery had other freight in containers from other shippers aboard) 
 
 
Shipper 
COMPANHIA BRASILEIRA DE RESINAS-RESIBRAS  
RUA 20 DE JANEIRO 1615 
FORTALEZA - CEARA - BRAZIL  
CEP 60331-200  
PHONE:55 85 288 7500  
 
Consignee 
UNITED NATURAL TRADING CO.  D/B/A  
HERSHEY IMPORT CO. INC. 
700 EAST LINCOLN AVE.  
RAHWAY, NJ  07065-5798 
 
Shipping Agent 
D.F YOUNG USA 
17 BATTERY PLACE 
NEW YORK, NY 10004 ATTN.MR FRANK BLANCO 
PHONE:973-258 9833 
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* 700 CARTON 16800.00 KGS 
1(ONE) CONTAINER 20FT SAID TO CONTAIN 700 
CARTONS BRAZILIAN CASHEWS NUT AS FOLLOWS: 
200 CARTONS W1-240 
100 CARTONS W2-240 
200 CARTONS W1-320 
200 CARTONS P1 
 
 
Shipper 
FRUITRADE COMÉRCIO E EXPORTAÇÃO LTDA.  
LOTE 417 - GALPÃO A - PROJETO CURAÇA  
CEP 48900-000 JUAZEIRO - BA - BRASIL  
PHONE/FAX:55 87 3991-2026  
 
Consignee 
FARM-WAY PRODUCE,INC.  
727 SOUTH, NEW YORK AVE.  
LAKELAN, FL 33815-4748 - USA  
PHONE/FAX:1 863 413-1200 
 
Shipping Agent 
CUSTOMIZED BROKERS RE:04/0990410-001 
7220 N.W.36TH STREET SD:2040775233/1 
MIAMI,FL 33152 SERVICE CONTRACT NUMBER: 2003-307 
PHONE:1 305 471 8989/FAX:1 305 471 8988 
 
* 11088 CARTON 49896.00 KGS (2 Refrig Containers) 
11.088 CARTONS WITH FRESH MANGOES IN NATURA 
 
 
Shipper 
GENERAL MOTORS VENEZOLANA C.A.  
AV.GENERAL MOTORS ZONA INDUSTRIAL II  
VALENCIA, EDO.CARABOBO  VENEZUELA 
PH.0241-503488 FAX.0241-8503568  
 
Consignee 
GENERAL MOTORS OF CANADA LTD.  
C/O TDS AUTOMOTIVE  
301 TILLSON AVE.  
TILLSONBURG ONT. CANADA  N4G 5E5  
ATTN:DAN GRAHAM  
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Shipping Agent 
EAGLE GLOBAL LOGISTICS . 
10049 HARRISON RD. SUITE 100 
ROMULUS, MI. 48174 
ATTN: ANGELA SIMS 
 
32 Containers, apparently of automotive parts 
 
 
Shipper 
VALORIZACAO EMPRESA DE CAFE S.A.  
RUA DA QUITANDA, 191/3º AND. SL 301  
CENTRO - RIO DE JANEIRO - BRASIL 
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
ATLANTIC (USA) INC 
17 STATE STREET 23rd FLOOR 
NEW YORK - USA 
PH 212 2481190 FAX 212 2484102 
 
1,280 BAGS 77440 LBS OF BRAZILIAN GREEN COFFEE. 
4 containers 
 
 
Shipper 
URUD'OR S.A. 000MVB 
RINCON 487 OF. 301 
MONTEVIDEO-URUGUAY  
PHONE: 5982 9160635 FAX: 5982 9161994  
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
BAR IMEX INT'L INC.  
1455 BERCY, ST.  
MONTREAL  H2K 2VI  
QUEBEC, CANADA 
PHONE: 514 525 6381 FAX: 514 525 1084 
 
8 refrigerated containers 
Lemons 2,520 cartons 48,170 Kg 
Navelate Oranges 3,080 cartons 53,030 Kg 
Salustiana Oranges 5,320 cartons 90,370 Kg 
 
Urud’Or had other containers aboard 
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Shipper 
WEG EXPORTADORA S.A. 
AVENIDA PREFEITO WALDEMAR GRUBBA 3000  
89256-900-JARAGUA DO SUL-SC-BRASIL  
PHONE 55 47 372-4000 FAX 55 47 372-4001  
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
V.J.PAMENSKY CANADA INC. 
64 SAMOR ROAD 
TORONTO, M6A 1J7  
ONTARIO- CANADA 
PHONE:1 416 781-4617 FAX:1 416 781-4352 
 
5 containers of electric motors and frequency converters 
 
 
 
MONTEMAR MARITIMA S.A.44 Manifest 
 
Shipper 
CASCAJU AGROINDUSTRIAL S\A  
AV. JOSÉ ANTUNES QUEIROZ, 2642  
CASCAVEL-CE-BRAZIL 
PHONE: 55 85 299 8717  
 
Consignee 
RED RIVER FOODS, INC. 
9020 STONY POINT PARKWAY - SUITE #380 
P.O . BOX 35612 
RICHMOND, VA 23235 - USA  
 
Shipping Agent 
RED RIVER FOODS, INC.  
C/O FERRARA INTL LOGISTICS, INC. 
HILLSIDE, NEW JERSEY 07205 - USA  
PHONE: 908 688 5009 - FAX: 908 688 9010 
 
* 700 CARTONs 16800.00 Kgs (1 20ft container) 
BRAZILIAN CASHEW NUT KERNELS PACKED IN CORVAC 
 
 
                                                
44 CSAV subsidiary 
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Shipper 
DUCOCO PRODUTOS ALIMENTICIOAS S.A. AV.  
ANASTACIO BRAGA, 2.776 - CACIMBAS  
ITAPIPOCA - CEARA - BRAZIL 
PHONE FAX: 55 85 631-1111  
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
EXPRESS FOODS INC.  
221 MILLER STREET 
NEWARK - NJ - 07114 
PHONE FAX: +1 (973) 6239211 
 
* 2793 CARTON 13587.46 Kg (1 20ft container) 
COCONUT WATER (AGUA DE COCO) & COCONUT WATER PRISMA (AGUA DE 
COCO PRISMA) 
 
 
Shipper 
CITRICOLA SALTENA S.A.  
PZA. CAGANCHA 1335 - OF. 1002 
Montevideo, URUGUAY 
PHONE 9011541 Fax 9011549 
  
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
AGRI MONDO INC. 
9240 BOUL. PIE IX 
MONTREAL,(QUEBEC)  
CANADA H1Z 4H7  
PHONE 3239240 Fax 3230611 
 
* 2800 CARTONs 47630.00 Kgs (2 40ft Refrig Containers) ORANGES NAVEL 
Citricola had other containers of citrus fruit aboard. 
 
 
Shipper 
VINPAC LINES (BUENOS AIRES) S.A. 
SARMIENTO 944 PISO 4 
C1041AAT BUENOS AIRES  ARGENTINA 
Ctc Sr RAUL MOURE 
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
NORTHSTAR SHIPPING & TRADING INC 
2855 MANGUM ROAD SUITE 535 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77092 
PIC MRS GRACIE DELGADO 
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11910.00 Kg ORGANIC SOYBEANS IN BULK (6 20ft containers) 
 
 
Shipper 
SOUTH CONE TRADING S.R.L.  
VIAMONTE 367 1ST FLOOR 
BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA 
N DE CUIT 30 70810694 8  
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
MAISLINER LOGISTICS . 
2555 DOLLARD AVENUE SUITE 119 
LASALLE MONTREAL QC H8N 3A9 
PHONE 1 514 366 0336 FAX 1 514 368 0626 
 
* 1260 CARTON 113,400.00 Kgs (107100 Kg Net) 
FRESH Argentine LEMONS 
5 40ft Refrig Containers 
 
 
Shipper 
NATCO INTERNATIONALE TRANSPORTE BRASIL  
L RUA DOM GERARDO, 64/10 ANDAR - CENTRO  
RIO DE JANEIRO - RJ - BRASIL  
PH: 5521 3288-9000 - FAX: 5521 3288-9001  
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
NATCO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTS USA, LLC 
2801 NW 74TH AVE, SUITE 224  
MIAMI, FLORIDA FL33122 
PHONE: 305 599-3285 - FAX: 599-3646 
 
* 1254 CARTONs 12704.00 Kg (1 20 ft Container) 
1254 CARTONS CONTAINING YERBA MATE AS FOLLOW: 8400 KILOS OF 
YERBA MATE FONTANA AND 4140 KILOS OF YERBA MATE GAUCHO 
 
 
 
LIBRA45 Manifest 
 
Shipper 
UTI DO BRASIL LTDA  
RUA: SALTO GRANDE, 701 - JARDIM DO TREVO  
CAMPINAS - SÃO PAULO - BRASIL  
                                                
45 CSAV subsidiary 
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PH. 55 19 3277 0630 FAX 55 19 3277 0630 
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
UTI, UNITED STATES INC. 
745, N. DILLON DR. 
WOOD DALE, ILLINOIS 60191 
MICHELLE SCHRADER 
PH.1 630 694 0680 FAX 1 630 694 0684 
 
78020 Kg (4 20ft containers) 4 BULK LINERS OF ORGANIC SOYBEAN MEAL 
 
 
Shipper 
ROHDE LIESENFELD DO BRASIL TRANSP INTERN  
RUA CONSELHEIRO LAURINDO, 825 - 10 AND  
80060-100- CURITIBA - BRAZIL  
PH. 55 41 324 5551 FAX 55 41 324 5551 
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
ROHDE & LIESENFELD, INC 
535 8TH AVENUE NY 10018 
NEW YORK - USA 
PH. 1 212 432 1200 FAX 1 212 432 1200 
 
21024 Kg (1 40ft Refrig Container) 1440 CARTONS WITH FRESH BRAZILIAN 
GINGER ROOTS 
 
 
Shipper 
REFINADORA DE MAIZ VENEZOLANA, C.A.  
"REMAVENCA" 
ENCRUCIJADA DE TURMERO  
EDO.ARAGUA-VENEZUELA  
 
Consignee 
GOYA FOODS INC.  
100 SEAVIEW DRIVE  
SECAUCUS NJ 07096. USA 
PH.201-348.4900 FAX.348.6609 R/R QGA200400119 
 
Shipping Agent 
EXPORT - IMPORT SERVICES 
900 ROUTE WOODBRIDGE, NJ 07095 
PH.(732)636.8700 FAX.636.6575 
 
18000 BAGS 36144.00 Kg (2 20ft containers) OF PRECOOKED WHITE CORN MEAL 
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Shipper 
PIRELLI PNEUS S.A.  
AV. GIOVANNI BATTISTA PIRELLI, Nº 871  
SANTO ANDRE-S.P.-BRASIL CEP.:09111-340  
PH.:(011)4998-5168 FAX.:(011)4998-5420  
 
Consignee 
PIRELLI TIRE LLC - FORD MICHIGAN  
6307 W.FORT STREET WAY 
48209 DETROIT, MICHIGAN 
PHONE: 7063685833 
 
Shipping Agent 
BRUZZONE SHIPPING INC. 
530 BURNSIDE AVENUE 
INWOOD, NY 11096 
ATTN VICTOR BRUZZONE 
 
19012 Kg (2 40ft Containers) 936 UNITS OF NEW PNEUMATIC TYRES FOR CARS 
 
 
Shipper 
AGROPECUARIA LABRUNIER LTDA.  
RUA GEORGE EASTMAN, 213 - 1º  
BAIRRO: VILA TRAMONTANO  
05690-000 - SÃO PAULO - SP - BRAZIL  
 
Consignee & Shipping Agent 
TALLY TRADING COMPANY INC. 
174 NORTH MEADOW CRESCENT  
THORNHILL L4J 3C5  
ONTARIO - CANADA 
 
4400 UNITS 46400.00 (2 40ft Refrig Containers) HONEY MURCOTT (TANGOL 
MURCOTT) 
 
 
Shipper 
AGRICOLA FRAIBURGO SA-FILIAL 01  
ROD.SC 453-KM 50,5 DISTRITO INDUSTRIAL  
DE RIO DAS PEDRAS  
89560-000 VIDEIRA-SC-BRASIL  
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Consignee 
WESTCOTT AGRI PRODUCTS INC 
RR 1 BOX 12  
ELGIN, MN 55932 - USA  
PHONE:507 876 2891 FAX:507 876 2820 
 
Shipping Agent 
BARTHCO 
721 CHESTNUT ST. 
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106 
AT.MR.PATRICK JOHNSON 
 
* 1176 CARTON 22579.20 (1 40ft Refrig Container) 1176 CARTONS OF FRESH 
APPLES AS FOLLOWS:  
280 GRANNY SMITH 90-BR APPLE 
168 GRANNY SMITH 100-BR APPLE 
224 GRANNY SMITH 110-BR APPLE 
224 GRANNY SMITH 120-BR APPLE 
280 GRANNY SMITH 135-BR APPLE 
 
 
 
Total Containers:  84 
Total Business Offices:  46 
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APPENDIX 
E 
Samples of Letter Sent to Container Shippers, Consignees & 
Shipping Agents 
ENGLISH 
Sir/Ma’am: 
I am an active duty U.S. Coast Guard officer who is currently a Sloan Fellow at the Sloan 
School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
I am currently conducting research for a thesis which will document the total 
international business costs incurred when the United States government delayed the 
voyage of the container ship CSAV RIO PUELO off of the Port of New York & New 
Jersey from 30 July until 6 August 2004.  The purpose of my research is to use the case 
of the CSAV RIO PUELO to help inform decisions of homeland security policymakers 
and international business leaders through a comprehensive view of extraordinary 
business expenses caused by interruptions in shipping.  I am working with such 
organizations as Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores (CSAV) and the Port Authority of 
New York & New Jersey in conducting my research. 
In conducting my research, I am attempting to identify and contact shippers and 
consignees of freight carried within the containers aboard the RIO PUELO.  I am 
interested in compiling the expenses incurred by these businesses as a result of the 
containers’ six-day delay in delivery.   
I would greatly appreciate a point of contact and any information you can provide 
concerning costs incurred by your firm as a result of the delayed arrival of your freight 
aboard the CSAV RIO PUELO.  I would like to document these costs even if they have 
been reimbursed by insurance or other means. 
I can be reached at: 
 31 Crestview Road 
 Needham, MA  02492-2707  USA  
 ejones@sloan.mit.edu 
 (339) 234-1020 (Mobile) 
 (781) 453-1250 (Office) 
Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. 
Sincerely, 
CDR Eric C. Jones, USCG 
MIT Sloan Fellow, 2005 
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PORTUGUESE 
Caro Senhor,  
Eu sou um oficial  da Guarda Costeira dos Estados Unidos e estou cursando o programa 
de Mestrado Sloan Fellows, na Escola de Administração Sloan, no Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT).   
Atualmente estou fazendo a pesquisa para minha tese que procura avaliar o custo total 
para os negócios internacionais que foi gerado quando o governo dos Estados Unidos 
resolveu reter o navio CSAV RIO PUELO, fora do Porto de New York e New Jersey 
entre os dias 30 de julho e 6 de agosto de 2004.  O proposito de minha tese é usar o caso 
do navio CSAV RIO PUELO para auxiliar as  autoridades de segurança e líderes de 
negócios internacionais na tomada de decisões através de uma visão abrangente do 
extraordinário custo para os negócios causado pela interrupção nos embarques.  Eu estou 
trabalhando junto com a Compañia Sudamericana de Vapores (CSAV) e as autoridades 
do Porto de Nova York para conduzir minha pesquisa. 
Durante minha pesquisa estou tentando identificar e contactar transportadores e clientes 
dos cargas em containers a bordo do CSAV RIO PUELO.  Estou interessado em obter as 
despesas incurridas por estas empresas devido ao atraso de seis dias na entrega do ditos 
containers.   
Eu gostaria muito de conseguir um contato com os senhores e qualquer informação a 
respeito dos custos incurridos por sua firma devido ao atraso no desembarque das cargas 
a bordo do CSAV RIO PUELO. Eu gostaria de avaliar todos os custos, inclusive aqueles 
reembolsados por companhias de seguro ou outros meios. 
Meu endereço de contato é: 
 31 Crestview Road 
 Needham, MA  02492-2707  USA  
 ejones@sloan.mit.edu 
 (339) 234-1020 (Mobile) 
 (781) 453-1250 (Office) 
Antecipadamente agradeço seu tempo e sua ajuda. 
Saudações,  
 
 
CDR Eric C. Jones, USCG 
MIT Sloan Fellow, 2005 
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SPANISH 
Estimado Sr./Sra. 
Yo soy un oficial de la Guardia Costera de los Estados Unidos y actualmente estoy 
realizando un master (Sloan Fellows Program) en el Instituto Tecnológico de Massachussets, 
en Boston. 
Como parte de este programa, estoy realizando un trabajo de investigación mediante el cual 
documentaré los costos totales internacionales que se incurrieron cuando el Gobierno de los 
Estados Unidos demoró el viaje del barco CSAV RIO PUELO, en aguas del puerto de New 
York y New Jersey, desde el 30 de Julio hasta el 6 de Agosto de 2004. 
El propósito de mi tesis consiste en utilizar el caso RIO PUELO para que tanto las 
autoridades locales como los líderes internacionales de negocios puedan, en el futuro, tomar 
decisiones basadas en información concreta, a través de un análisis detallado de los costos 
extraordinarios causados por interrupciones de embarcaciones de transporte. Es importante 
resaltar que en el marco de mi tesis estoy trabajando con organizaciones como Compañía 
Sudamericana de Vapores (CSAV) y las autoridades portuarias de New York y New Jersey. 
Como parte importante de mi trabajo estoy tratando de identificar y contactar compañías 
involucradas con los contenedores que viajaban a bordo del RIO PUELO. Específicamente, 
estaría interesado en determinar los costos incurridos por estas empresas como resultado de la 
demora de 6 días mencionada anteriormente. 
Les agradecería enormemente si me pudiesen indicar una persona de referencia a contactar, 
asi como cualquier información que me pudiesen brindar acerca de los costos que ustedes 
sufrieron en la desafortunada situación del RIO PUELO. Me gustaría poder documentar estos 
costos aun en el caso en que los mismos hubiesen sido reembolsados a posteriori. 
Yo puedo ser contactado en: 
 31 Crestview Road 
 Needham, MA  02492-2707  USA  
 ejones@sloan.mit.edu 
 (339) 234-1020 (Mobile) 
 (781) 453-1250 (Office) 
Les agradezco anticipadamente vuestro tiempo y asistencia, 
 
Cordialmente, 
 
 
CDR Eric C. Jones, USCG 
MIT Sloan Fellow, 2005 
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APPENDIX 
F 
Samples of Information Emails CSAV Sent to Customers 
 
To Customers-at-Large 
 
Customer Information 
 
August 6, 2004 
 
Compania Sudamericana de Vapores S.A. (CSAV) wishes to advise its customers of 
facts concerning the detention of one of its vessels servicing the Argentina-Brazil-
USA trade. 
1. On July 31, 2004, the U.S. government informed us that they had received an 
anonymous tip that a refrigerated cargo container being transported on one of our 
vessels might contain harmful substances.  
2. The containers in question were loaded in Zarate, Argentina, transferred to the 
vessel "CSAV Rio Puelo," at the port of Rio Grande, Brazil with a final destination in 
Canada, via the United States.  
3. The vessel arrived outside of the Port of New York and New Jersey on July 31st.  
The company has been cooperating fully with the authorities having jurisdiction since 
we became aware of this issue. The vessel has been waiting at anchor outside the Port, 
while the authorities have considered how to proceed in the safest possible manner.  
4. CSAV and our agents are working in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to 
transfer any containers in question to a barge or other acceptable shoreside location to 
allow the appropriate government agencies to take what steps they deem necessary.  
5.  CSAV regrets the delay this incident may have caused our customers with cargo 
aboard the vessel, but the company’s highest priority is to cooperate with the 
government in addressing any security issues that may arise.  We will complete vessel 
operations and proceed with scheduled cargo deliveries as soon as possible. 
6. CSAV will continue to refer any questions about the details of this incident to the 
U.S. Coast Guard for response.  
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To Shippers and Consignees with Cargo Aboard CSAV RIO PUELO 
 
 
Dear Valued Customer, 
 
 
In order to keep your company informed about a delay in our schedule, we are 
advising you that MV CSAV Rio Puelo v. 003SB arrived New York Pilot Station 
on July 31, 2004, at 00:44 LT.  
 
She has been held by the U.S. Coast Guard for inspection and the inspection 
process is still ongoing. 
 
We will keep you informed about any relevant developments and will provide a 
new schedule as soon as this situation is finalized. We don’t expect to have any 
new information earlier than Wednesday August 4th noontime. 
 
Thanks for your understanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
American Transportation Group LLC,  
as agents of Compañia SudAmericana de Vapores, Libra and Montemar. 
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